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Chapter 10 Defensive Navigation for Master
以下為您提供原文內容的繁體中文翻譯：
10 - 01 防禦性航行（Defensive Navigation）
防禦性航行是航海人員不可或缺的專業技能，涵蓋了在沿海區域選擇航路時所需的風險意識與決策能力。這一過程不僅在船舶駛離碼頭前至關重要，在擁擠與狹窄的水道中航行時同樣關鍵。航海人員必須能夠預判本船及他船的操縱意圖與限制，選擇最簡單的航路以避開潛在危險。在這些水域中航行面臨著獨特的挑戰，錯誤的選擇可能導致嚴重後果，包括坐底（擱淺）、碰撞以及海洋環境災難。這種風險在船舶密集、近距離作業的高交通流量區域尤為突出。為了強調防禦性航行的重要性，我們將探討發生在新加坡東採樣區/東引水人登艦區（Singapore Pilot Eastern Boarding Ground）的兩起著名事故案例。
房地產領域有一句名言叫「地段、地段，還是地段（location, location, location）」，這句話同樣適用於航程計劃（Voyage Planning）。在電子海圖顯示與資訊系統（ECDIS）訓練中，我們強調使用「禁航區（no-go areas）」與安全等深線（safety contours），以避開礁石、淺灘和沉船等靜態危險。然而，在自動雷達測繪板（ARPA）訓練中，涉及動態威脅（如沿海船舶或漁船等移動目標）的動態危險區域往往未得到足夠的重視。當穿越狹窄航道時，航行員可能會覺得自己是在碰運氣，因為他們似乎無法採取什麼有效措施來降低潛在風險。
一名審慎的航海人員會在易發生碰撞的區域保持高度警惕，經常在常規醫令/站立醫令（Standing Orders）、夜航命令簿（Night Order Books）或紙本海圖上標註「至此呼叫船長（Call Captain here）」。然而，這些易發生碰撞的區域並不總是容易辨識，因為值班航行員（OOW）可能會過於專注於多個目標同時帶來的單獨碰撞風險。有效的航行不僅僅是一門預測的藝術，更是一門預判與防範（Anticipation）的藝術。
在航程計劃中，我們的目標是避開靜態航行障礙。而在防禦性航行中，我們著重於預測每個潛在目標所帶來的碰撞風險，並在本船進入這些易發生碰撞的區域之前將其識別出來。讓我們進一步探討這些情境，並思考如何提升我們的航行實務。
10.01.01 2009 年 9 月 16 日蒙哥塞巴洛克礁（Monggok Sebarok Reef）的強迫擱淺
在英國海事專署（MCA）第 2/2010 號報告中，記錄了一起發生於 2009 年 9 月 16 日的顯著事故：一艘英國籍貨櫃船在新加坡海峽的蒙哥塞巴洛克礁擱淺。導致此次擱淺的一連串事件始於該船向右舷改向，以讓路給駛離鍾航道（Jong Channel）的三艘船舶。這一操縱無意中將船隻引向了礁石。船長原本打算在從第三艘船的船艉通過後，再向左舷改向並返回原定計畫航線。不幸的是，這個決策執行得太晚了。儘管接獲了新加坡船舶交通資訊系統（VTIS）的多項警告，該船仍未及時減速或改向以避免擱淺。結果導致船菴（船首）遭受嚴重損壞，所幸並未造成人員傷亡或水域污染。
事故分析
英國海事事故調查局（MAIB）進行的調查指出，駕駛台團隊合作存在多項致命失誤，進而導致了事故發生：
圖 10 – 01 0703 時，資淺航行員（OOW）的安全操縱
航程計劃不充分：駕駛台團隊未針對船舶航行制定全面、完善的計劃，而這是安全航行的基石。
位置監控不佳：缺乏對船舶相對於航行危險物位置的有效監控，這在繁忙的沿海水道中至關重要。
通訊無效：駕駛台團隊成員之間的互動缺乏，背後反映出對局勢的麻痺大意（Complacency）。
事故發生後，船公司採取了多項糾正措施。他們確保未來的航行審計將檢查航行資料紀錄器（VDR）數據列為標準做法。此外，所有駕駛台船員現在都被要求接受船員資源管理（CRM）訓練，旨在提升團隊合作與通訊技巧。
國際航運公會（ICS）也採取了行動，向其會員發布了一份通告，強調從近期海事事故中吸取的教訓。該通告強烈支持航行員參加駕駛台團隊管理訓練課程的必要性。此外，海事與海岸警衛局（MCA）承諾支持針對《航海人員訓練、發證及值勤標準國際公約》（STCW）提出的修訂草案，特別是關於駕駛台資源管理中的領導力與管理技能。鑑於這些主動採取的措施，MAIB 未再發出進一步的安全建議。
歷史背景與教育意義
這起發生於 15 年前的事故，在駕駛台人力資源管理（BHRM）系列叢書的「防禦性航行」一章中有詳細記載。
本案例的一個關鍵啟示是：BRM（駕駛台資源管理）或 BHRM 訓練的精髓在於所傳授知識的深度，而非僅僅是貼在訓練計畫上的標籤名稱。
在調查期間，BRM 被宣傳為提升航行安全的有效解決方案；然而，這種觀念後來被證明具有誤導性。
如果 BRM 真能有效防止此類事件發生，我們就不會目睹美軍艦艇於 2017 年 6 月與 8 月在日本和新加坡沿海術語水域與商船相撞的事故。雖然 BRM 在航運界被視為美國標準，但英國觀點往往將事故歸因於人為因素（Human Factors）。
核心訊息始終明確：沒有知識，就不可能產生意識。在海洋航行的領域中，知識必須凌駕於一切之上。
10.01.02 動態航行預測
正如審慎的航海員常說的：「航行是一門預測的藝術。」正如船長應察覺即將到來的風暴一樣，他們也必須對碰撞風險保持敏銳的預測能力。這種意識源於知識，而知識在海洋航行中高於一切。即使目標船舶仍處於港口內，船長了解其潛在的下一個目的港也是至關重要的。
利用自動識別系統（AIS）數據來確定船舶的下一個目的地，是資淺航行員應養成的審慎做法，甚至不需要資深船長提醒。然而，需要注意的是，AIS 標註的目的港在船舶離港時可能未必總是最新狀態。此外，船舶在港口內的實際位置或航線往往能為其意圖提供寶貴的線索，使航海人員無需僅僅依賴 AIS 數據或 VHF 口頭通訊即可做出明智決策。
在圖 10-01 中，我們觀察到 0703 時的情況：本船正以 20 節的速度向西南方向航行。船舶交通服務（VTS）已廣播有三艘出港船舶（不包括最後一艘）。船長正操縱船舶駛向第一艘出港船的船艉，只要理解交叉速度向量（crossing speed vectors）的含義，這對資淺值班航行員（OOW）來說通常是一次審慎的操縱。
圖 10 – 02 多向交通流的複雜/危險水域
然而，當本船接近東向航道附近的警戒區（Precaution Area）時，局勢變得複雜起來。如果只有一艘出港船，標準的操縱協定會建議逐漸將航向改向目標船的船艉，以確保安全航行。
航海人員必須認識到，三艘船舶接續離港、每艘間隔 1 海浬，這一距離是受管制水道中常見的安全標準。這種在 VTS 或運河當局監控下的間距，對於有效管理進港與出港交通至關重要。航海人員應具備在兩艘相距 1 海浬的船舶之間穿越的能力。
對於一名審慎的航海員來說，前往遠東的東向船舶航程計劃，通常會將其航線設定在港口界限內出港航道的東側附近（如粉紅色航線所示）。這一策略旨在盡量減少跨越進入警戒區的情況，並避免與從東向分道航行制（TSS）巷道進港的船舶發生衝突。
在圖 10-02 中，出港航道被劃分為三條不同顏色的路徑，每條路徑旨在促進快速穿過警戒區，同時將與交叉及對頭（end-on）交通的遭遇降至最低。位於最靠近航道東側的粉紅色路徑，旨在減少與來自南方及東南方駛近的進港船隻之衝突。
這條粉紅色路徑有效縮小了在警戒區內使用的水域面積，引導船舶向東航行，這符合前往遠東的總體流向，如「Ace Dragon」輪所示。
黃色路徑旨在以直角穿過警戒區，以實現速度與效率的最佳化，儘管這種交通情況相對罕見。
透過分析出港船舶的速度向量，其在警戒區內的航行意圖會變得更加清晰。「Kota Delima」輪正駛向東向巷道，這與粉紅色路徑所示的軌跡一致。
與此同時，位於航道西側的「Bright Pacific」輪之位置引發了對其意圖的疑問：她是在準備等待，還是將向西航行？其行動的不確定性需要進行密切監控。
圖 10 - 03 0708 時，船舶保持原航向駛向下一艘出港船
即使在圖 10-01 中，也可以明顯看出「Ace Dragon」輪（以黑色箭頭表示其速度向量）在該距離上並未構成碰撞威脅，即使本船航速達 20 節（以綠色箭頭表示）。「Ace Dragon」輪距離「Maersk Kendal」輪的綠色速度向量有 3 分鐘的安全距離，表明不存在即時的碰撞風險。
10.01.03 透過動態預測提升環境意識
10 - 01 防禦性航行（Defensive Navigation）
防禦性航行是航海人員不可或缺的專業技能，涵蓋了在沿海區域選擇航路時所需的風險意識與決策能力。這一過程不僅在船舶駛離碼頭前至關重要，在擁擠與狹窄的水道中航行時同樣關鍵。航海人員必須能夠預判本船及他船的操縱意圖與限制，選擇最簡單的航路以避開潛在危險。在這些水域中航行面臨著獨特的挑戰，錯誤的選擇可能導致嚴重後果，包括坐底（擱淺）、碰撞以及海洋環境災難。這種風險在船舶密集、近距離作業的高交通流量區域尤為突出。為了強調防禦性航行的重要性，我們將探討發生在新加坡東採樣區/東引水人登艦區（Singapore Pilot Eastern Boarding Ground）的兩起著名事故案例。
房地產領域有一句名言叫「地段、地段，還是地段（location, location, location）」，這句話同樣適用於航程計劃（Voyage Planning）。在電子海圖顯示與資訊系統（ECDIS）訓練中，我們強調使用「禁航區（no-go areas）」與安全等深線（safety contours），以避開礁石、淺灘和沉船等靜態危險。然而，在自動雷達測繪板（ARPA）訓練中，涉及動態威脅（如沿海船舶或漁船等移動目標）的動態危險區域往往未得到足夠的重視。當穿越狹窄航道時，航行員可能會覺得自己是在碰運氣，因為他們似乎無法採取什麼有效措施來降低潛在風險。
一名審慎的航海人員會在易發生碰撞的區域保持高度警惕，經常在常規醫令/站立醫令（Standing Orders）、夜航命令簿（Night Order Books）或紙本海圖上標註「至此呼叫船長（Call Captain here）」。然而，這些易發生碰撞的區域並不總是容易辨識，因為值班航行員（OOW）可能會過於專注於多個目標同時帶來的單獨碰撞風險。有效的航行不僅僅是一門預測的藝術，更是一門預判與防範（Anticipation）的藝術。
在航程計劃中，我們的目標是避開靜態航行障礙。而在防禦性航行中，我們著重於預測每個潛在目標所帶來的碰撞風險，並在本船進入這些易發生碰撞的區域之前將其識別出來。讓我們進一步探討這些情境，並思考如何提升我們的航行實務。
10.01.01 2009 年 9 月 16 日蒙哥塞巴洛克礁（Monggok Sebarok Reef）的強迫擱淺
在英國海事專署（MCA）第 2/2010 號報告中，記錄了一起發生於 2009 年 9 月 16 日的顯著事故：一艘英國籍貨櫃船在新加坡海峽的蒙哥塞巴洛克礁擱淺。導致此次擱淺的一連串事件始於該船向右舷改向，以讓路給駛離鍾航道（Jong Channel）的三艘船舶。這一操縱無意中將船隻引向了礁石。船長原本打算在從第三艘船的船艉通過後，再向左舷改向並返回原定計畫航線。不幸的是，這個決策執行得太晚了。儘管接獲了新加坡船舶交通資訊系統（VTIS）的多項警告，該船仍未及時減速或改向以避免擱淺。結果導致船菴（船首）遭受嚴重損壞，所幸並未造成人員傷亡或水域污染。
事故分析
英國海事事故調查局（MAIB）進行的調查指出，駕駛台團隊合作存在多項致命失誤，進而導致了事故發生：
圖 10 – 01 0703 時，資淺航行員（OOW）的安全操縱
航程計劃不充分：駕駛台團隊未針對船舶航行制定全面、完善的計劃，而這是安全航行的基石。
位置監控不佳：缺乏對船舶相對於航行危險物位置的有效監控，這在繁忙的沿海水道中至關重要。
通訊無效：駕駛台團隊成員之間的互動缺乏，背後反映出對局勢的麻痺大意（Complacency）。
事故發生後，船公司採取了多項糾正措施。他們確保未來的航行審計將檢查航行資料紀錄器（VDR）數據列為標準做法。此外，所有駕駛台船員現在都被要求接受船員資源管理（CRM）訓練，旨在提升團隊合作與通訊技巧。
國際航運公會（ICS）也採取了行動，向其會員發布了一份通告，強調從近期海事事故中吸取的教訓。該通告強烈支持航行員參加駕駛台團隊管理訓練課程的必要性。此外，海事與海岸警衛局（MCA）承諾支持針對《航海人員訓練、發證及值勤標準國際公約》（STCW）提出的修訂草案，特別是關於駕駛台資源管理中的領導力與管理技能。鑑於這些主動採取的措施，MAIB 未再發出進一步的安全建議。
歷史背景與教育意義
這起發生於 15 年前的事故，在駕駛台人力資源管理（BHRM）系列叢書的「防禦性航行」一章中有詳細記載。
本案例的一個關鍵啟示是：BRM（駕駛台資源管理）或 BHRM 訓練的精髓在於所傳授知識的深度，而非僅僅是貼在訓練計畫上的標籤名稱。
在調查期間，BRM 被宣傳為提升航行安全的有效解決方案；然而，這種觀念後來被證明具有誤導性。
如果 BRM 真能有效防止此類事件發生，我們就不會目睹美軍艦艇於 2017 年 6 月與 8 月在日本和新加坡沿海術語水域與商船相撞的事故。雖然 BRM 在航運界被視為美國標準，但英國觀點往往將事故歸因於人為因素（Human Factors）。
核心訊息始終明確：沒有知識，就不可能產生意識。在海洋航行的領域中，知識必須凌駕於一切之上。
10.01.02 動態航行預測
正如審慎的航海員常說的：「航行是一門預測的藝術。」正如船長應察覺即將到來的風暴一樣，他們也必須對碰撞風險保持敏銳的預測能力。這種意識源於知識，而知識在海洋航行中高於一切。即使目標船舶仍處於港口內，船長了解其潛在的下一個目的港也是至關重要的。
利用自動識別系統（AIS）數據來確定船舶的下一個目的地，是資淺航行員應養成的審慎做法，甚至不需要資深船長提醒。然而，需要注意的是，AIS 標註的目的港在船舶離港時可能未必總是最新狀態。此外，船舶在港口內的實際位置或航線往往能為其意圖提供寶貴的線索，使航海人員無需僅僅依賴 AIS 數據或 VHF 口頭通訊即可做出明智決策。
在圖 10-01 中，我們觀察到 0703 時的情況：本船正以 20 節的速度向西南方向航行。船舶交通服務（VTS）已廣播有三艘出港船舶（不包括最後一艘）。船長正操縱船舶駛向第一艘出港船的船艉，只要理解交叉速度向量（crossing speed vectors）的含義，這對資淺值班航行員（OOW）來說通常是一次審慎的操縱。
圖 10 – 02 多向交通流的複雜/危險水域
然而，當本船接近東向航道附近的警戒區（Precaution Area）時，局勢變得複雜起來。如果只有一艘出港船，標準的操縱協定會建議逐漸將航向改向目標船的船艉，以確保安全航行。
航海人員必須認識到，三艘船舶接續離港、每艘間隔 1 海浬，這一距離是受管制水道中常見的安全標準。這種在 VTS 或運河當局監控下的間距，對於有效管理進港與出港交通至關重要。航海人員應具備在兩艘相距 1 海浬的船舶之間穿越的能力。
對於一名審慎的航海員來說，前往遠東的東向船舶航程計劃，通常會將其航線設定在港口界限內出港航道的東側附近（如粉紅色航線所示）。這一策略旨在盡量減少跨越進入警戒區的情況，並避免與從東向分道航行制（TSS）巷道進港的船舶發生衝突。
在圖 10-02 中，出港航道被劃分為三條不同顏色的路徑，每條路徑旨在促進快速穿過警戒區，同時將與交叉及對頭（end-on）交通的遭遇降至最低。位於最靠近航道東側的粉紅色路徑，旨在減少與來自南方及東南方駛近的進港船隻之衝突。
這條粉紅色路徑有效縮小了在警戒區內使用的水域面積，引導船舶向東航行，這符合前往遠東的總體流向，如「Ace Dragon」輪所示。
黃色路徑旨在以直角穿過警戒區，以實現速度與效率的最佳化，儘管這種交通情況相對罕見。
透過分析出港船舶的速度向量，其在警戒區內的航行意圖會變得更加清晰。「Kota Delima」輪正駛向東向巷道，這與粉紅色路徑所示的軌跡一致。
與此同時，位於航道西側的「Bright Pacific」輪之位置引發了對其意圖的疑問：她是在準備等待，還是將向西航行？其行動的不確定性需要進行密切監控。
圖 10 - 03 0708 時，船舶保持原航向駛向下一艘出港船
即使在圖 10-01 中，也可以明顯看出「Ace Dragon」輪（以黑色箭頭表示其速度向量）在該距離上並未構成碰撞威脅，即使本船航速達 20 節（以綠色箭頭表示）。「Ace Dragon」輪距離「Maersk Kendal」輪的綠色速度向量有 3 分鐘的安全距離，表明不存在即時的碰撞風險。
10.01.03 透過動態預測提升環境意識
售價 NT$ 300
10 - 01 Defensive Navigation
Defensive navigation is an essential skill for mariners, involving the awareness and decision-making
required when selecting routes in coastal areas. This process is crucial not only before a vessel
departs the berth but also while navigating congested and narrow passages. Mariners must be able
to anticipate the maneuvering intentions and limitations of their own vessel as well as those of
others, taking the simplest route to evade potential hazards. Navigating these waters presents
unique challenges, where an incorrect choice can lead to serious consequences, including grounding,
collisions, and environmental disasters. This risk is particularly pronounced in high-traffic zones,
where multiple vessels operate in close proximity. To emphasize the importance of defensive
navigation, we will examine two well-documented incidents that occurred in the Singapore Pilot
Eastern Boarding Ground.
The principle of "location, location, location" is a well-known adage in real estate, yet it is equally
applicable to voyage planning. In Electronic Display of Chart Information and Systems (EDCIS)
training, we emphasize the use of "no-go areas" and safety contours to avoid static dangers such as
reefs, shallow waters, and shipwrecks. However, in Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) training,
dynamic danger areas involving movable threats—such as coastal vessels or fishing boats—often
receive insufficient attention. When transiting through narrow channels, navigators may feel as if
they are relying on luck, as there seems to be little they can do to mitigate potential risks.
A prudent navigator exercises extreme caution in collision-prone areas, frequently noting "Call
Captain here" in standing orders, night order books, or on paper charts. However, these collision
prone areas are not always readily identifiable, as the Officer of the Watch (OOW) may become too
focused on the individual collision risks presented by multiple targets simultaneously. Effective
navigation is not merely an art of prediction but also one of anticipation.
In voyage planning, we aim to avoid static navigational hazards. In defensive navigation, we
concentrate on foreseeing the collision risks posed by every potential target and identifying collision
prone areas before our vessel enters them. Let us explore these scenarios further and consider how
we can enhance our navigational practices.
10.01.01 Forced Grounding at Monggok Sebarok reef on September 16, 2009
In the MCA Report No. 2/2010, a notable incident involved a UK-registered container ship that ran
aground on the Monggok Sebarok reef in the Singapore Strait on September 16, 2009. The chain of
events leading to this grounding began when the vessel altered its course to starboard to yield to
three vessels exiting the Jong Channel. This maneuver inadvertently directed the ship towards the
reef. The captain intended to subsequently alter course to port and return to the original planned
track after passing astern of the third vessel. Unfortunately, this decision was executed too late.
Despite receiving multiple warnings from the Singapore Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS), the
vessel did not reduce its speed or alter its course in a timely manner to avoid grounding.
Consequently, the ship sustained substantial damage to its bow, although it is fortunate that there
were no injuries or pollution incidents reported as a result.
Analysis of the Incident
The investigation conducted by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) identified several
critical failures in bridge teamwork that contributed to the incident:
Figure 10 – 01 0703 hours, safe maneuvering for a junior OOW
⚫ Inadequate Passage Planning: The bridge team did not develop a comprehensive plan for the
vessel's passage, which is fundamental to safe navigation.
⚫ Poor Position Monitoring: There was a lack of effective monitoring of the vessel's position
relative to navigational hazards, which is vital in busy coastal waters.
⚫ Ineffective Communication: Interaction among bridge team members was lacking, underpinned
by a sense of complacency about the situation.
In the aftermath of the accident, the shipping company implemented several corrective measures.
They ensured that future navigational audits include examinations of Voyage Data Recorder (VDR)
data as a standard practice. Additionally, all bridge team officers are now required to undergo crew
resource management training, aimed at enhancing teamwork and communication skills.
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) also took action, distributing a circular to its members
emphasizing the lessons learned from recent maritime accidents. The circular strongly supports the
necessity for navigating officers to attend bridge team management training courses. Moreover, the
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) has committed to supporting proposed amendments to
STCW (Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers) requirements,
particularly concerning leadership and management skills in bridge resource management. Given
these proactive steps, the MAIB issued no further safety recommendations.
Historical Context and Educational Implications
This incident, which occurred 15 years ago, is thoroughly detailed in the "Defensive Navigation"
chapter of the BHRM (Bridge Human Resource Management) series.
⚫ A key takeaway from this case is that the essence of BRM (Bridge Resource Management) or
BHRM training lies in the depth of knowledge imparted, rather than merely the labels attached
to training programs.
⚫ At the time of the investigation, BRM was promoted as an effective solution for enhancing
navigation safety; however, this perception proved to be misleading.
⚫ If BRM were truly effective in preventing such incidents, we would not have witnessed the
collision of an American naval vessel with a merchant ship in Japan and Singapore coastal
waters in June and August 2017. While BRM is regarded as an American standard in shipping,
British perspectives often attribute incidents and accidents to human factors.
The overarching message remains clear: without knowledge, there can be no awareness. Knowledge
must precede all else in the realm of maritime navigation.
10.01.02 Dynamic Navigation Prediction
As prudent navigators often say, "Navigation is an art of prediction." Just as a captain should be
aware of an impending storm, they must also maintain a keen prediction of collision risks. This
awareness stems from knowledge, which is paramount in maritime navigation. Even when target
vessels are still within the harbor, it is crucial for a captain to understand their potential next ports of
call.
Utilizing AIS (Automatic Identification System) data to determine a vessel's next destination is a
prudent practice for junior officers to adopt, even without prompting from senior captains.
However, it's important to note that the AIS port of call may not always be updated at the time of
their departure. Additionally, a vessel's actual position or route at harboar can often provide
valuable insights into its intentions, enabling navigators to make informed decisions without relying
solely on AIS data or VHF verbal communication.
In Figure 10-01, we observe the situation at 0703 hours, where the own ship is heading southwest at
a speed of 20 knots. The Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) has announced three outbound vessels,
excluding the last one. The captain is navigating toward the stern of the first outbound vessel, which
is typically a prudent maneuver for a junior Officer of the Watch (OOW), provided they understand
the implications of crossing speed vectors.
Figure 10 – 02, in the trouble waters of multi direction traffic flow
However, the situation becomes complex as this vessel approaches the precaution area near the
eastbound channel. With only one vessel outbound, standard maneuvering protocol would suggest
gradually altering course toward the target vessel’s stern to ensure safe navigation.
⚫ It is crucial for the navigator to recognize that with three vessels departing in succession, each
spaced one nautical mile apart, this distance is a common safety standard in controlled
waterways. Such spacing, overseen by VTS or canal authorities, is essential for managing
inbound and outbound traffic effectively. Navigators should be capable of transiting between
two vessels that are one nautical mile apart.
⚫ For a prudent seaman, the passage plan for eastbound vessels heading toward the Far East
typically positions their course close to the eastern side of the outbound fairway within the
harbor limits, represented by the pink-colored route. This strategy aims to minimize crossing
into the precautionary area and to avoid conflicts with vessels inbound from the eastbound
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) lane.
⚫ In Figure 10-02, the outbound fairway is segmented into three distinct colored paths, each
designed to facilitate rapid transit through the precaution area while minimizing encounters
with crossing and end-on traffic. The pink path, positioned closest to the eastern side of the
fairway, aims to mitigate conflicts with vessels inbound from the south and those approaching
from the southeast.
⚫ This pink path effectively minimizes the area utilized within the precaution area, directing
vessels eastward, which aligns with the general flow towards the Far East, as illustrated by the
M.V. "Ace Dragon."
⚫ The yellow path is intended for transiting the precautionary area at a right angle, optimizing for
speed and efficiency, although this traffic is relatively rare.
⚫ By analyzing the speed vectors of the outbound vessels, their navigational intentions within the
precaution area become clearer. The M.V. "Kota Delima" is heading toward the eastbound lane,
consistent with the trajectory indicated by the pink path.
⚫ Meanwhile, the position of the M.V. "Bright Pacific," situated on the western side of the
fairway, raises questions about her intentions. Is she preparing to wait, or will she proceed
westbound? The uncertainty regarding her actions necessitates vigilant monitoring.
Figure 10 - 03 0708 hours, vessel steady on same course for next outbound vessel
Even in Figure 10-01, it is evident that the "Ace Dragon" (indicated by the black arrow as her speed
vector) does not pose a collision threat at this distance, even with the own ship’s speed of 20 knots
(shown by the green arrow). The "Ace Dragon" is safely three minutes away from the green speed
vector of the "Maersk Kendal," indicating that there is no immediate risk of collision.
10.01.03 Situational Awareness by Dynamic Prediction.
At 0703 hours, as illustrated in Figure 10-01, what course should the "Maersk Kendal" take? A skilled
navigator must be able to predict the vessel's position after three or six minutes based on its current
speed vector, which includes both course and speed. Similarly, it is essential to forecast where the
"Ace Dragon" will be after the same time frame, utilizing the speed vector displayed in AIS or ARPA.
By employing the three or six-minute speed vectors for both vessels, we can determine that if the
"Ace Dragon" maintains its current course and speed, it will have already entered the westbound
lane. As a result, the "Maersk Kendal" does not need to give way to the "Ace Dragon" and can safely
remain centered in the westbound lane.
However, our attention must now turn to the next two outbound vessels. Specifically, we need to
assess the situation regarding the second vessel, the "Kota Delima." We can similarly ascertain the
position of these vessels after six minutes by using their six-minute speed vectors. To determine our
course of action concerning the "Kota Delima," we should apply the radar lookout skills previously
utilized for the "Ace Dragon." This involves closely monitoring her speed vector to evaluate her
trajectory and speed, which will inform our navigational decisions.
By the time we reach Figure 10-04 at 0710 hours, the "Maersk Kendal" is on a course of 274 degrees
at a speed of 19 knots, moving further to starboard compared to the third outbound vessel, the
"Bright Pacific," which was on a course of 265 degrees just two minutes earlier. This misjudgment
may have resulted from distractions caused by VTS communications with the captain. At this point,
the navigational options are limited: the vessel can either execute a quick turn to cross the bow of
the "Bright Pacific" or perform a complete 360-degree turn to starboard.
Figure 10 – 04 at 0710 hours, vessel already within 3 minutes speed vector range
10.01.04 Before Grounding
In Figure 10-05, taken at 0713 hours—just one minute before grounding—the captain attempts to
redirect the vessel back to the port side, aiming to follow the stern of the outbound vessel, as
illustrated in Figure 10 - 05. However, the captain fails to recognize a fundamental principle of
navigation: a large vessel requires approximately three minutes to complete a turn. This is why we
use three-minute speed vectors to assess whether the own ship has sufficient space to execute a
turn.
In traditional seamanship, the distance covered in three minutes at the current speed is referred to
as the "point of no return." If the distance to be traveled forward is less than the distance that can
be covered in three minutes, the vessel will be unable to turn back from its current heading. Even
with the rudder hard over to port or starboard, the vessel has a minimal chance of avoiding the
island ahead.
This critical understanding should be instinctual for mariners, representing the competence in
seamanship. By employing three-minute speed vectors, as discussed in the previous chapter,
navigators can cultivate a heightened sense of situational awareness. This awareness, enhanced by
radar visualization, is vital for making informed decisions at critical moments.
As we navigate increasingly complex environments, the ability to anticipate the consequences of our
maneuvers becomes paramount. Effective decision-making relies not only on technical skills but also
on a deep understanding of the dynamics of maritime navigation. Ensuring that this knowledge is
Defensive navigation is an essential skill for mariners, involving the awareness and decision-making
required when selecting routes in coastal areas. This process is crucial not only before a vessel
departs the berth but also while navigating congested and narrow passages. Mariners must be able
to anticipate the maneuvering intentions and limitations of their own vessel as well as those of
others, taking the simplest route to evade potential hazards. Navigating these waters presents
unique challenges, where an incorrect choice can lead to serious consequences, including grounding,
collisions, and environmental disasters. This risk is particularly pronounced in high-traffic zones,
where multiple vessels operate in close proximity. To emphasize the importance of defensive
navigation, we will examine two well-documented incidents that occurred in the Singapore Pilot
Eastern Boarding Ground.
The principle of "location, location, location" is a well-known adage in real estate, yet it is equally
applicable to voyage planning. In Electronic Display of Chart Information and Systems (EDCIS)
training, we emphasize the use of "no-go areas" and safety contours to avoid static dangers such as
reefs, shallow waters, and shipwrecks. However, in Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) training,
dynamic danger areas involving movable threats—such as coastal vessels or fishing boats—often
receive insufficient attention. When transiting through narrow channels, navigators may feel as if
they are relying on luck, as there seems to be little they can do to mitigate potential risks.
A prudent navigator exercises extreme caution in collision-prone areas, frequently noting "Call
Captain here" in standing orders, night order books, or on paper charts. However, these collision
prone areas are not always readily identifiable, as the Officer of the Watch (OOW) may become too
focused on the individual collision risks presented by multiple targets simultaneously. Effective
navigation is not merely an art of prediction but also one of anticipation.
In voyage planning, we aim to avoid static navigational hazards. In defensive navigation, we
concentrate on foreseeing the collision risks posed by every potential target and identifying collision
prone areas before our vessel enters them. Let us explore these scenarios further and consider how
we can enhance our navigational practices.
10.01.01 Forced Grounding at Monggok Sebarok reef on September 16, 2009
In the MCA Report No. 2/2010, a notable incident involved a UK-registered container ship that ran
aground on the Monggok Sebarok reef in the Singapore Strait on September 16, 2009. The chain of
events leading to this grounding began when the vessel altered its course to starboard to yield to
three vessels exiting the Jong Channel. This maneuver inadvertently directed the ship towards the
reef. The captain intended to subsequently alter course to port and return to the original planned
track after passing astern of the third vessel. Unfortunately, this decision was executed too late.
Despite receiving multiple warnings from the Singapore Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS), the
vessel did not reduce its speed or alter its course in a timely manner to avoid grounding.
Consequently, the ship sustained substantial damage to its bow, although it is fortunate that there
were no injuries or pollution incidents reported as a result.
Analysis of the Incident
The investigation conducted by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) identified several
critical failures in bridge teamwork that contributed to the incident:
Figure 10 – 01 0703 hours, safe maneuvering for a junior OOW
⚫ Inadequate Passage Planning: The bridge team did not develop a comprehensive plan for the
vessel's passage, which is fundamental to safe navigation.
⚫ Poor Position Monitoring: There was a lack of effective monitoring of the vessel's position
relative to navigational hazards, which is vital in busy coastal waters.
⚫ Ineffective Communication: Interaction among bridge team members was lacking, underpinned
by a sense of complacency about the situation.
In the aftermath of the accident, the shipping company implemented several corrective measures.
They ensured that future navigational audits include examinations of Voyage Data Recorder (VDR)
data as a standard practice. Additionally, all bridge team officers are now required to undergo crew
resource management training, aimed at enhancing teamwork and communication skills.
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) also took action, distributing a circular to its members
emphasizing the lessons learned from recent maritime accidents. The circular strongly supports the
necessity for navigating officers to attend bridge team management training courses. Moreover, the
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) has committed to supporting proposed amendments to
STCW (Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers) requirements,
particularly concerning leadership and management skills in bridge resource management. Given
these proactive steps, the MAIB issued no further safety recommendations.
Historical Context and Educational Implications
This incident, which occurred 15 years ago, is thoroughly detailed in the "Defensive Navigation"
chapter of the BHRM (Bridge Human Resource Management) series.
⚫ A key takeaway from this case is that the essence of BRM (Bridge Resource Management) or
BHRM training lies in the depth of knowledge imparted, rather than merely the labels attached
to training programs.
⚫ At the time of the investigation, BRM was promoted as an effective solution for enhancing
navigation safety; however, this perception proved to be misleading.
⚫ If BRM were truly effective in preventing such incidents, we would not have witnessed the
collision of an American naval vessel with a merchant ship in Japan and Singapore coastal
waters in June and August 2017. While BRM is regarded as an American standard in shipping,
British perspectives often attribute incidents and accidents to human factors.
The overarching message remains clear: without knowledge, there can be no awareness. Knowledge
must precede all else in the realm of maritime navigation.
10.01.02 Dynamic Navigation Prediction
As prudent navigators often say, "Navigation is an art of prediction." Just as a captain should be
aware of an impending storm, they must also maintain a keen prediction of collision risks. This
awareness stems from knowledge, which is paramount in maritime navigation. Even when target
vessels are still within the harbor, it is crucial for a captain to understand their potential next ports of
call.
Utilizing AIS (Automatic Identification System) data to determine a vessel's next destination is a
prudent practice for junior officers to adopt, even without prompting from senior captains.
However, it's important to note that the AIS port of call may not always be updated at the time of
their departure. Additionally, a vessel's actual position or route at harboar can often provide
valuable insights into its intentions, enabling navigators to make informed decisions without relying
solely on AIS data or VHF verbal communication.
In Figure 10-01, we observe the situation at 0703 hours, where the own ship is heading southwest at
a speed of 20 knots. The Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) has announced three outbound vessels,
excluding the last one. The captain is navigating toward the stern of the first outbound vessel, which
is typically a prudent maneuver for a junior Officer of the Watch (OOW), provided they understand
the implications of crossing speed vectors.
Figure 10 – 02, in the trouble waters of multi direction traffic flow
However, the situation becomes complex as this vessel approaches the precaution area near the
eastbound channel. With only one vessel outbound, standard maneuvering protocol would suggest
gradually altering course toward the target vessel’s stern to ensure safe navigation.
⚫ It is crucial for the navigator to recognize that with three vessels departing in succession, each
spaced one nautical mile apart, this distance is a common safety standard in controlled
waterways. Such spacing, overseen by VTS or canal authorities, is essential for managing
inbound and outbound traffic effectively. Navigators should be capable of transiting between
two vessels that are one nautical mile apart.
⚫ For a prudent seaman, the passage plan for eastbound vessels heading toward the Far East
typically positions their course close to the eastern side of the outbound fairway within the
harbor limits, represented by the pink-colored route. This strategy aims to minimize crossing
into the precautionary area and to avoid conflicts with vessels inbound from the eastbound
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) lane.
⚫ In Figure 10-02, the outbound fairway is segmented into three distinct colored paths, each
designed to facilitate rapid transit through the precaution area while minimizing encounters
with crossing and end-on traffic. The pink path, positioned closest to the eastern side of the
fairway, aims to mitigate conflicts with vessels inbound from the south and those approaching
from the southeast.
⚫ This pink path effectively minimizes the area utilized within the precaution area, directing
vessels eastward, which aligns with the general flow towards the Far East, as illustrated by the
M.V. "Ace Dragon."
⚫ The yellow path is intended for transiting the precautionary area at a right angle, optimizing for
speed and efficiency, although this traffic is relatively rare.
⚫ By analyzing the speed vectors of the outbound vessels, their navigational intentions within the
precaution area become clearer. The M.V. "Kota Delima" is heading toward the eastbound lane,
consistent with the trajectory indicated by the pink path.
⚫ Meanwhile, the position of the M.V. "Bright Pacific," situated on the western side of the
fairway, raises questions about her intentions. Is she preparing to wait, or will she proceed
westbound? The uncertainty regarding her actions necessitates vigilant monitoring.
Figure 10 - 03 0708 hours, vessel steady on same course for next outbound vessel
Even in Figure 10-01, it is evident that the "Ace Dragon" (indicated by the black arrow as her speed
vector) does not pose a collision threat at this distance, even with the own ship’s speed of 20 knots
(shown by the green arrow). The "Ace Dragon" is safely three minutes away from the green speed
vector of the "Maersk Kendal," indicating that there is no immediate risk of collision.
10.01.03 Situational Awareness by Dynamic Prediction.
At 0703 hours, as illustrated in Figure 10-01, what course should the "Maersk Kendal" take? A skilled
navigator must be able to predict the vessel's position after three or six minutes based on its current
speed vector, which includes both course and speed. Similarly, it is essential to forecast where the
"Ace Dragon" will be after the same time frame, utilizing the speed vector displayed in AIS or ARPA.
By employing the three or six-minute speed vectors for both vessels, we can determine that if the
"Ace Dragon" maintains its current course and speed, it will have already entered the westbound
lane. As a result, the "Maersk Kendal" does not need to give way to the "Ace Dragon" and can safely
remain centered in the westbound lane.
However, our attention must now turn to the next two outbound vessels. Specifically, we need to
assess the situation regarding the second vessel, the "Kota Delima." We can similarly ascertain the
position of these vessels after six minutes by using their six-minute speed vectors. To determine our
course of action concerning the "Kota Delima," we should apply the radar lookout skills previously
utilized for the "Ace Dragon." This involves closely monitoring her speed vector to evaluate her
trajectory and speed, which will inform our navigational decisions.
By the time we reach Figure 10-04 at 0710 hours, the "Maersk Kendal" is on a course of 274 degrees
at a speed of 19 knots, moving further to starboard compared to the third outbound vessel, the
"Bright Pacific," which was on a course of 265 degrees just two minutes earlier. This misjudgment
may have resulted from distractions caused by VTS communications with the captain. At this point,
the navigational options are limited: the vessel can either execute a quick turn to cross the bow of
the "Bright Pacific" or perform a complete 360-degree turn to starboard.
Figure 10 – 04 at 0710 hours, vessel already within 3 minutes speed vector range
10.01.04 Before Grounding
In Figure 10-05, taken at 0713 hours—just one minute before grounding—the captain attempts to
redirect the vessel back to the port side, aiming to follow the stern of the outbound vessel, as
illustrated in Figure 10 - 05. However, the captain fails to recognize a fundamental principle of
navigation: a large vessel requires approximately three minutes to complete a turn. This is why we
use three-minute speed vectors to assess whether the own ship has sufficient space to execute a
turn.
In traditional seamanship, the distance covered in three minutes at the current speed is referred to
as the "point of no return." If the distance to be traveled forward is less than the distance that can
be covered in three minutes, the vessel will be unable to turn back from its current heading. Even
with the rudder hard over to port or starboard, the vessel has a minimal chance of avoiding the
island ahead.
This critical understanding should be instinctual for mariners, representing the competence in
seamanship. By employing three-minute speed vectors, as discussed in the previous chapter,
navigators can cultivate a heightened sense of situational awareness. This awareness, enhanced by
radar visualization, is vital for making informed decisions at critical moments.
As we navigate increasingly complex environments, the ability to anticipate the consequences of our
maneuvers becomes paramount. Effective decision-making relies not only on technical skills but also
on a deep understanding of the dynamics of maritime navigation. Ensuring that this knowledge is
