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Chapter 10 Defensive Navigation for Master
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10 - 01 防御性航行（Defensive Navigation）
防御性航行是航海人员不可或缺的专业技能，涵盖了在沿海区域选择航路时所需的风险意识与决策能力。这一过程不仅在船舶驶离码头前至关重要，在拥挤与狭窄的水道中航行时同样关键。航海人员必须能够预判本船及他船的操纵意图与限制，选择最简单的航路以避开潜在危险。在这些水域中航行面临著独特的挑战，错误的选择可能导致严重后果，包括坐底（搁浅）、碰撞以及海洋环境灾难。这种风险在船舶密集、近距离作业的高交通流量区域尤为突出。为了强调防御性航行的重要性，我们将探讨发生在新加坡东采样区/东引水人登舰区（Singapore Pilot Eastern Boarding Ground）的两起著名事故案例。
房地产领域有一句名言叫「地段、地段，还是地段（location, location, location）」，这句话同样适用於航程计划（Voyage Planning）。在电子海图显示与资讯系统（ECDIS）训练中，我们强调使用「禁航区（no-go areas）」与安全等深线（safety contours），以避开礁石、浅滩和沉船等静态危险。然而，在自动雷达测绘板（ARPA）训练中，涉及动态威胁（如沿海船舶或渔船等移动目标）的动态危险区域往往未得到足够的重视。当穿越狭窄航道时，航行员可能会觉得自己是在碰运气，因为他们似乎无法采取什么有效措施来降低潜在风险。
一名审慎的航海人员会在易发生碰撞的区域保持高度警惕，经常在常规医令/站立医令（Standing Orders）、夜航命令簿（Night Order Books）或纸本海图上标注「至此呼叫船长（Call Captain here）」。然而，这些易发生碰撞的区域并不总是容易辨识，因为值班航行员（OOW）可能会过於专注於多个目标同时带来的单独碰撞风险。有效的航行不仅仅是一门预测的艺术，更是一门预判与防范（Anticipation）的艺术。
在航程计划中，我们的目标是避开静态航行障碍。而在防御性航行中，我们著重於预测每个潜在目标所带来的碰撞风险，并在本船进入这些易发生碰撞的区域之前将其识别出来。让我们进一步探讨这些情境，并思考如何提升我们的航行实务。
10.01.01 2009 年 9 月 16 日蒙哥塞巴洛克礁（Monggok Sebarok Reef）的强迫搁浅
在英国海事专署（MCA）第 2/2010 号报告中，记录了一起发生於 2009 年 9 月 16 日的显著事故：一艘英国籍货柜船在新加坡海峡的蒙哥塞巴洛克礁搁浅。导致此次搁浅的一连串事件始於该船向右舷改向，以让路给驶离钟航道（Jong Channel）的三艘船舶。这一操纵无意中将船只引向了礁石。船长原本打算在从第三艘船的船艉通过后，再向左舷改向并返回原定计画航线。不幸的是，这个决策执行得太晚了。尽管接获了新加坡船舶交通资讯系统（VTIS）的多项警告，该船仍未及时减速或改向以避免搁浅。结果导致船庵（船首）遭受严重损坏，所幸并未造成人员伤亡或水域污染。
事故分析
英国海事事故调查局（MAIB）进行的调查指出，驾驶台团队合作存在多项致命失误，进而导致了事故发生：
图 10 – 01 0703 时，资浅航行员（OOW）的安全操纵
航程计划不充分：驾驶台团队未针对船舶航行制定全面、完善的计划，而这是安全航行的基石。
位置监控不佳：缺乏对船舶相对於航行危险物位置的有效监控，这在繁忙的沿海水道中至关重要。
通讯无效：驾驶台团队成员之间的互动缺乏，背后反映出对局势的麻痹大意（Complacency）。
事故发生后，船公司采取了多项纠正措施。他们确保未来的航行审计将检查航行资料纪录器（VDR）数据列为标准做法。此外，所有驾驶台船员现在都被要求接受船员资源管理（CRM）训练，旨在提升团队合作与通讯技巧。
国际航运公会（ICS）也采取了行动，向其会员发布了一份通告，强调从近期海事事故中吸取的教训。该通告强烈支持航行员参加驾驶台团队管理训练课程的必要性。此外，海事与海岸警卫局（MCA）承诺支持针对《航海人员训练、发证及值勤标准国际公约》（STCW）提出的修订草案，特别是关於驾驶台资源管理中的领导力与管理技能。鉴於这些主动采取的措施，MAIB 未再发出进一步的安全建议。
历史背景与教育意义
这起发生於 15 年前的事故，在驾驶台人力资源管理（BHRM）系列丛书的「防御性航行」一章中有详细记载。
本案例的一个关键启示是：BRM（驾驶台资源管理）或 BHRM 训练的精髓在於所传授知识的深度，而非仅仅是贴在训练计画上的标签名称。
在调查期间，BRM 被宣传为提升航行安全的有效解决方案；然而，这种观念后来被证明具有误导性。
如果 BRM 真能有效防止此类事件发生，我们就不会目睹美军舰艇於 2017 年 6 月与 8 月在日本和新加坡沿海术语水域与商船相撞的事故。虽然 BRM 在航运界被视为美国标准，但英国观点往往将事故归因於人为因素（Human Factors）。
核心讯息始终明确：没有知识，就不可能产生意识。在海洋航行的领域中，知识必须凌驾於一切之上。
10.01.02 动态航行预测
正如审慎的航海员常说的：「航行是一门预测的艺术。」正如船长应察觉即将到来的风暴一样，他们也必须对碰撞风险保持敏锐的预测能力。这种意识源於知识，而知识在海洋航行中高於一切。即使目标船舶仍处於港口内，船长了解其潜在的下一个目的港也是至关重要的。
利用自动识别系统（AIS）数据来确定船舶的下一个目的地，是资浅航行员应养成的审慎做法，甚至不需要资深船长提醒。然而，需要注意的是，AIS 标注的目的港在船舶离港时可能未必总是最新状态。此外，船舶在港口内的实际位置或航线往往能为其意图提供宝贵的线索，使航海人员无需仅仅依赖 AIS 数据或 VHF 口头通讯即可做出明智决策。
在图 10-01 中，我们观察到 0703 时的情况：本船正以 20 节的速度向西南方向航行。船舶交通服务（VTS）已广播有三艘出港船舶（不包括最后一艘）。船长正操纵船舶驶向第一艘出港船的船艉，只要理解交叉速度向量（crossing speed vectors）的含义，这对资浅值班航行员（OOW）来说通常是一次审慎的操纵。
图 10 – 02 多向交通流的复杂/危险水域
然而，当本船接近东向航道附近的警戒区（Precaution Area）时，局势变得复杂起来。如果只有一艘出港船，标准的操纵协定会建议逐渐将航向改向目标船的船艉，以确保安全航行。
航海人员必须认识到，三艘船舶接续离港、每艘间隔 1 海里，这一距离是受管制水道中常见的安全标准。这种在 VTS 或运河当局监控下的间距，对於有效管理进港与出港交通至关重要。航海人员应具备在两艘相距 1 海里的船舶之间穿越的能力。
对於一名审慎的航海员来说，前往远东的东向船舶航程计划，通常会将其航线设定在港口界限内出港航道的东侧附近（如粉红色航线所示）。这一策略旨在尽量减少跨越进入警戒区的情况，并避免与从东向分道航行制（TSS）巷道进港的船舶发生冲突。
在图 10-02 中，出港航道被划分为三条不同颜色的路径，每条路径旨在促进快速穿过警戒区，同时将与交叉及对头（end-on）交通的遭遇降至最低。位於最靠近航道东侧的粉红色路径，旨在减少与来自南方及东南方驶近的进港船只之冲突。
这条粉红色路径有效缩小了在警戒区内使用的水域面积，引导船舶向东航行，这符合前往远东的总体流向，如「Ace Dragon」轮所示。
黄色路径旨在以直角穿过警戒区，以实现速度与效率的最佳化，尽管这种交通情况相对罕见。
透过分析出港船舶的速度向量，其在警戒区内的航行意图会变得更加清晰。「Kota Delima」轮正驶向东向巷道，这与粉红色路径所示的轨迹一致。
与此同时，位於航道西侧的「Bright Pacific」轮之位置引发了对其意图的疑问：她是在准备等待，还是将向西航行？其行动的不确定性需要进行密切监控。
图 10 - 03 0708 时，船舶保持原航向驶向下一艘出港船
即使在图 10-01 中，也可以明显看出「Ace Dragon」轮（以黑色箭头表示其速度向量）在该距离上并未构成碰撞威胁，即使本船航速达 20 节（以绿色箭头表示）。「Ace Dragon」轮距离「Maersk Kendal」轮的绿色速度向量有 3 分钟的安全距离，表明不存在即时的碰撞风险。
10.01.03 透过动态预测提升环境意识
10 - 01 防御性航行（Defensive Navigation）
防御性航行是航海人员不可或缺的专业技能，涵盖了在沿海区域选择航路时所需的风险意识与决策能力。这一过程不仅在船舶驶离码头前至关重要，在拥挤与狭窄的水道中航行时同样关键。航海人员必须能够预判本船及他船的操纵意图与限制，选择最简单的航路以避开潜在危险。在这些水域中航行面临著独特的挑战，错误的选择可能导致严重后果，包括坐底（搁浅）、碰撞以及海洋环境灾难。这种风险在船舶密集、近距离作业的高交通流量区域尤为突出。为了强调防御性航行的重要性，我们将探讨发生在新加坡东采样区/东引水人登舰区（Singapore Pilot Eastern Boarding Ground）的两起著名事故案例。
房地产领域有一句名言叫「地段、地段，还是地段（location, location, location）」，这句话同样适用於航程计划（Voyage Planning）。在电子海图显示与资讯系统（ECDIS）训练中，我们强调使用「禁航区（no-go areas）」与安全等深线（safety contours），以避开礁石、浅滩和沉船等静态危险。然而，在自动雷达测绘板（ARPA）训练中，涉及动态威胁（如沿海船舶或渔船等移动目标）的动态危险区域往往未得到足够的重视。当穿越狭窄航道时，航行员可能会觉得自己是在碰运气，因为他们似乎无法采取什么有效措施来降低潜在风险。
一名审慎的航海人员会在易发生碰撞的区域保持高度警惕，经常在常规医令/站立医令（Standing Orders）、夜航命令簿（Night Order Books）或纸本海图上标注「至此呼叫船长（Call Captain here）」。然而，这些易发生碰撞的区域并不总是容易辨识，因为值班航行员（OOW）可能会过於专注於多个目标同时带来的单独碰撞风险。有效的航行不仅仅是一门预测的艺术，更是一门预判与防范（Anticipation）的艺术。
在航程计划中，我们的目标是避开静态航行障碍。而在防御性航行中，我们著重於预测每个潜在目标所带来的碰撞风险，并在本船进入这些易发生碰撞的区域之前将其识别出来。让我们进一步探讨这些情境，并思考如何提升我们的航行实务。
10.01.01 2009 年 9 月 16 日蒙哥塞巴洛克礁（Monggok Sebarok Reef）的强迫搁浅
在英国海事专署（MCA）第 2/2010 号报告中，记录了一起发生於 2009 年 9 月 16 日的显著事故：一艘英国籍货柜船在新加坡海峡的蒙哥塞巴洛克礁搁浅。导致此次搁浅的一连串事件始於该船向右舷改向，以让路给驶离钟航道（Jong Channel）的三艘船舶。这一操纵无意中将船只引向了礁石。船长原本打算在从第三艘船的船艉通过后，再向左舷改向并返回原定计画航线。不幸的是，这个决策执行得太晚了。尽管接获了新加坡船舶交通资讯系统（VTIS）的多项警告，该船仍未及时减速或改向以避免搁浅。结果导致船庵（船首）遭受严重损坏，所幸并未造成人员伤亡或水域污染。
事故分析
英国海事事故调查局（MAIB）进行的调查指出，驾驶台团队合作存在多项致命失误，进而导致了事故发生：
图 10 – 01 0703 时，资浅航行员（OOW）的安全操纵
航程计划不充分：驾驶台团队未针对船舶航行制定全面、完善的计划，而这是安全航行的基石。
位置监控不佳：缺乏对船舶相对於航行危险物位置的有效监控，这在繁忙的沿海水道中至关重要。
通讯无效：驾驶台团队成员之间的互动缺乏，背后反映出对局势的麻痹大意（Complacency）。
事故发生后，船公司采取了多项纠正措施。他们确保未来的航行审计将检查航行资料纪录器（VDR）数据列为标准做法。此外，所有驾驶台船员现在都被要求接受船员资源管理（CRM）训练，旨在提升团队合作与通讯技巧。
国际航运公会（ICS）也采取了行动，向其会员发布了一份通告，强调从近期海事事故中吸取的教训。该通告强烈支持航行员参加驾驶台团队管理训练课程的必要性。此外，海事与海岸警卫局（MCA）承诺支持针对《航海人员训练、发证及值勤标准国际公约》（STCW）提出的修订草案，特别是关於驾驶台资源管理中的领导力与管理技能。鉴於这些主动采取的措施，MAIB 未再发出进一步的安全建议。
历史背景与教育意义
这起发生於 15 年前的事故，在驾驶台人力资源管理（BHRM）系列丛书的「防御性航行」一章中有详细记载。
本案例的一个关键启示是：BRM（驾驶台资源管理）或 BHRM 训练的精髓在於所传授知识的深度，而非仅仅是贴在训练计画上的标签名称。
在调查期间，BRM 被宣传为提升航行安全的有效解决方案；然而，这种观念后来被证明具有误导性。
如果 BRM 真能有效防止此类事件发生，我们就不会目睹美军舰艇於 2017 年 6 月与 8 月在日本和新加坡沿海术语水域与商船相撞的事故。虽然 BRM 在航运界被视为美国标准，但英国观点往往将事故归因於人为因素（Human Factors）。
核心讯息始终明确：没有知识，就不可能产生意识。在海洋航行的领域中，知识必须凌驾於一切之上。
10.01.02 动态航行预测
正如审慎的航海员常说的：「航行是一门预测的艺术。」正如船长应察觉即将到来的风暴一样，他们也必须对碰撞风险保持敏锐的预测能力。这种意识源於知识，而知识在海洋航行中高於一切。即使目标船舶仍处於港口内，船长了解其潜在的下一个目的港也是至关重要的。
利用自动识别系统（AIS）数据来确定船舶的下一个目的地，是资浅航行员应养成的审慎做法，甚至不需要资深船长提醒。然而，需要注意的是，AIS 标注的目的港在船舶离港时可能未必总是最新状态。此外，船舶在港口内的实际位置或航线往往能为其意图提供宝贵的线索，使航海人员无需仅仅依赖 AIS 数据或 VHF 口头通讯即可做出明智决策。
在图 10-01 中，我们观察到 0703 时的情况：本船正以 20 节的速度向西南方向航行。船舶交通服务（VTS）已广播有三艘出港船舶（不包括最后一艘）。船长正操纵船舶驶向第一艘出港船的船艉，只要理解交叉速度向量（crossing speed vectors）的含义，这对资浅值班航行员（OOW）来说通常是一次审慎的操纵。
图 10 – 02 多向交通流的复杂/危险水域
然而，当本船接近东向航道附近的警戒区（Precaution Area）时，局势变得复杂起来。如果只有一艘出港船，标准的操纵协定会建议逐渐将航向改向目标船的船艉，以确保安全航行。
航海人员必须认识到，三艘船舶接续离港、每艘间隔 1 海里，这一距离是受管制水道中常见的安全标准。这种在 VTS 或运河当局监控下的间距，对於有效管理进港与出港交通至关重要。航海人员应具备在两艘相距 1 海里的船舶之间穿越的能力。
对於一名审慎的航海员来说，前往远东的东向船舶航程计划，通常会将其航线设定在港口界限内出港航道的东侧附近（如粉红色航线所示）。这一策略旨在尽量减少跨越进入警戒区的情况，并避免与从东向分道航行制（TSS）巷道进港的船舶发生冲突。
在图 10-02 中，出港航道被划分为三条不同颜色的路径，每条路径旨在促进快速穿过警戒区，同时将与交叉及对头（end-on）交通的遭遇降至最低。位於最靠近航道东侧的粉红色路径，旨在减少与来自南方及东南方驶近的进港船只之冲突。
这条粉红色路径有效缩小了在警戒区内使用的水域面积，引导船舶向东航行，这符合前往远东的总体流向，如「Ace Dragon」轮所示。
黄色路径旨在以直角穿过警戒区，以实现速度与效率的最佳化，尽管这种交通情况相对罕见。
透过分析出港船舶的速度向量，其在警戒区内的航行意图会变得更加清晰。「Kota Delima」轮正驶向东向巷道，这与粉红色路径所示的轨迹一致。
与此同时，位於航道西侧的「Bright Pacific」轮之位置引发了对其意图的疑问：她是在准备等待，还是将向西航行？其行动的不确定性需要进行密切监控。
图 10 - 03 0708 时，船舶保持原航向驶向下一艘出港船
即使在图 10-01 中，也可以明显看出「Ace Dragon」轮（以黑色箭头表示其速度向量）在该距离上并未构成碰撞威胁，即使本船航速达 20 节（以绿色箭头表示）。「Ace Dragon」轮距离「Maersk Kendal」轮的绿色速度向量有 3 分钟的安全距离，表明不存在即时的碰撞风险。
10.01.03 透过动态预测提升环境意识
售价 NT$ 300
10 - 01 Defensive Navigation
Defensive navigation is an essential skill for mariners, involving the awareness and decision-making
required when selecting routes in coastal areas. This process is crucial not only before a vessel
departs the berth but also while navigating congested and narrow passages. Mariners must be able
to anticipate the maneuvering intentions and limitations of their own vessel as well as those of
others, taking the simplest route to evade potential hazards. Navigating these waters presents
unique challenges, where an incorrect choice can lead to serious consequences, including grounding,
collisions, and environmental disasters. This risk is particularly pronounced in high-traffic zones,
where multiple vessels operate in close proximity. To emphasize the importance of defensive
navigation, we will examine two well-documented incidents that occurred in the Singapore Pilot
Eastern Boarding Ground.
The principle of "location, location, location" is a well-known adage in real estate, yet it is equally
applicable to voyage planning. In Electronic Display of Chart Information and Systems (EDCIS)
training, we emphasize the use of "no-go areas" and safety contours to avoid static dangers such as
reefs, shallow waters, and shipwrecks. However, in Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) training,
dynamic danger areas involving movable threats—such as coastal vessels or fishing boats—often
receive insufficient attention. When transiting through narrow channels, navigators may feel as if
they are relying on luck, as there seems to be little they can do to mitigate potential risks.
A prudent navigator exercises extreme caution in collision-prone areas, frequently noting "Call
Captain here" in standing orders, night order books, or on paper charts. However, these collision
prone areas are not always readily identifiable, as the Officer of the Watch (OOW) may become too
focused on the individual collision risks presented by multiple targets simultaneously. Effective
navigation is not merely an art of prediction but also one of anticipation.
In voyage planning, we aim to avoid static navigational hazards. In defensive navigation, we
concentrate on foreseeing the collision risks posed by every potential target and identifying collision
prone areas before our vessel enters them. Let us explore these scenarios further and consider how
we can enhance our navigational practices.
10.01.01 Forced Grounding at Monggok Sebarok reef on September 16, 2009
In the MCA Report No. 2/2010, a notable incident involved a UK-registered container ship that ran
aground on the Monggok Sebarok reef in the Singapore Strait on September 16, 2009. The chain of
events leading to this grounding began when the vessel altered its course to starboard to yield to
three vessels exiting the Jong Channel. This maneuver inadvertently directed the ship towards the
reef. The captain intended to subsequently alter course to port and return to the original planned
track after passing astern of the third vessel. Unfortunately, this decision was executed too late.
Despite receiving multiple warnings from the Singapore Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS), the
vessel did not reduce its speed or alter its course in a timely manner to avoid grounding.
Consequently, the ship sustained substantial damage to its bow, although it is fortunate that there
were no injuries or pollution incidents reported as a result.
Analysis of the Incident
The investigation conducted by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) identified several
critical failures in bridge teamwork that contributed to the incident:
Figure 10 – 01 0703 hours, safe maneuvering for a junior OOW
⚫ Inadequate Passage Planning: The bridge team did not develop a comprehensive plan for the
vessel's passage, which is fundamental to safe navigation.
⚫ Poor Position Monitoring: There was a lack of effective monitoring of the vessel's position
relative to navigational hazards, which is vital in busy coastal waters.
⚫ Ineffective Communication: Interaction among bridge team members was lacking, underpinned
by a sense of complacency about the situation.
In the aftermath of the accident, the shipping company implemented several corrective measures.
They ensured that future navigational audits include examinations of Voyage Data Recorder (VDR)
data as a standard practice. Additionally, all bridge team officers are now required to undergo crew
resource management training, aimed at enhancing teamwork and communication skills.
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) also took action, distributing a circular to its members
emphasizing the lessons learned from recent maritime accidents. The circular strongly supports the
necessity for navigating officers to attend bridge team management training courses. Moreover, the
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) has committed to supporting proposed amendments to
STCW (Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers) requirements,
particularly concerning leadership and management skills in bridge resource management. Given
these proactive steps, the MAIB issued no further safety recommendations.
Historical Context and Educational Implications
This incident, which occurred 15 years ago, is thoroughly detailed in the "Defensive Navigation"
chapter of the BHRM (Bridge Human Resource Management) series.
⚫ A key takeaway from this case is that the essence of BRM (Bridge Resource Management) or
BHRM training lies in the depth of knowledge imparted, rather than merely the labels attached
to training programs.
⚫ At the time of the investigation, BRM was promoted as an effective solution for enhancing
navigation safety; however, this perception proved to be misleading.
⚫ If BRM were truly effective in preventing such incidents, we would not have witnessed the
collision of an American naval vessel with a merchant ship in Japan and Singapore coastal
waters in June and August 2017. While BRM is regarded as an American standard in shipping,
British perspectives often attribute incidents and accidents to human factors.
The overarching message remains clear: without knowledge, there can be no awareness. Knowledge
must precede all else in the realm of maritime navigation.
10.01.02 Dynamic Navigation Prediction
As prudent navigators often say, "Navigation is an art of prediction." Just as a captain should be
aware of an impending storm, they must also maintain a keen prediction of collision risks. This
awareness stems from knowledge, which is paramount in maritime navigation. Even when target
vessels are still within the harbor, it is crucial for a captain to understand their potential next ports of
call.
Utilizing AIS (Automatic Identification System) data to determine a vessel's next destination is a
prudent practice for junior officers to adopt, even without prompting from senior captains.
However, it's important to note that the AIS port of call may not always be updated at the time of
their departure. Additionally, a vessel's actual position or route at harboar can often provide
valuable insights into its intentions, enabling navigators to make informed decisions without relying
solely on AIS data or VHF verbal communication.
In Figure 10-01, we observe the situation at 0703 hours, where the own ship is heading southwest at
a speed of 20 knots. The Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) has announced three outbound vessels,
excluding the last one. The captain is navigating toward the stern of the first outbound vessel, which
is typically a prudent maneuver for a junior Officer of the Watch (OOW), provided they understand
the implications of crossing speed vectors.
Figure 10 – 02, in the trouble waters of multi direction traffic flow
However, the situation becomes complex as this vessel approaches the precaution area near the
eastbound channel. With only one vessel outbound, standard maneuvering protocol would suggest
gradually altering course toward the target vessel’s stern to ensure safe navigation.
⚫ It is crucial for the navigator to recognize that with three vessels departing in succession, each
spaced one nautical mile apart, this distance is a common safety standard in controlled
waterways. Such spacing, overseen by VTS or canal authorities, is essential for managing
inbound and outbound traffic effectively. Navigators should be capable of transiting between
two vessels that are one nautical mile apart.
⚫ For a prudent seaman, the passage plan for eastbound vessels heading toward the Far East
typically positions their course close to the eastern side of the outbound fairway within the
harbor limits, represented by the pink-colored route. This strategy aims to minimize crossing
into the precautionary area and to avoid conflicts with vessels inbound from the eastbound
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) lane.
⚫ In Figure 10-02, the outbound fairway is segmented into three distinct colored paths, each
designed to facilitate rapid transit through the precaution area while minimizing encounters
with crossing and end-on traffic. The pink path, positioned closest to the eastern side of the
fairway, aims to mitigate conflicts with vessels inbound from the south and those approaching
from the southeast.
⚫ This pink path effectively minimizes the area utilized within the precaution area, directing
vessels eastward, which aligns with the general flow towards the Far East, as illustrated by the
M.V. "Ace Dragon."
⚫ The yellow path is intended for transiting the precautionary area at a right angle, optimizing for
speed and efficiency, although this traffic is relatively rare.
⚫ By analyzing the speed vectors of the outbound vessels, their navigational intentions within the
precaution area become clearer. The M.V. "Kota Delima" is heading toward the eastbound lane,
consistent with the trajectory indicated by the pink path.
⚫ Meanwhile, the position of the M.V. "Bright Pacific," situated on the western side of the
fairway, raises questions about her intentions. Is she preparing to wait, or will she proceed
westbound? The uncertainty regarding her actions necessitates vigilant monitoring.
Figure 10 - 03 0708 hours, vessel steady on same course for next outbound vessel
Even in Figure 10-01, it is evident that the "Ace Dragon" (indicated by the black arrow as her speed
vector) does not pose a collision threat at this distance, even with the own ship’s speed of 20 knots
(shown by the green arrow). The "Ace Dragon" is safely three minutes away from the green speed
vector of the "Maersk Kendal," indicating that there is no immediate risk of collision.
10.01.03 Situational Awareness by Dynamic Prediction.
At 0703 hours, as illustrated in Figure 10-01, what course should the "Maersk Kendal" take? A skilled
navigator must be able to predict the vessel's position after three or six minutes based on its current
speed vector, which includes both course and speed. Similarly, it is essential to forecast where the
"Ace Dragon" will be after the same time frame, utilizing the speed vector displayed in AIS or ARPA.
By employing the three or six-minute speed vectors for both vessels, we can determine that if the
"Ace Dragon" maintains its current course and speed, it will have already entered the westbound
lane. As a result, the "Maersk Kendal" does not need to give way to the "Ace Dragon" and can safely
remain centered in the westbound lane.
However, our attention must now turn to the next two outbound vessels. Specifically, we need to
assess the situation regarding the second vessel, the "Kota Delima." We can similarly ascertain the
position of these vessels after six minutes by using their six-minute speed vectors. To determine our
course of action concerning the "Kota Delima," we should apply the radar lookout skills previously
utilized for the "Ace Dragon." This involves closely monitoring her speed vector to evaluate her
trajectory and speed, which will inform our navigational decisions.
By the time we reach Figure 10-04 at 0710 hours, the "Maersk Kendal" is on a course of 274 degrees
at a speed of 19 knots, moving further to starboard compared to the third outbound vessel, the
"Bright Pacific," which was on a course of 265 degrees just two minutes earlier. This misjudgment
may have resulted from distractions caused by VTS communications with the captain. At this point,
the navigational options are limited: the vessel can either execute a quick turn to cross the bow of
the "Bright Pacific" or perform a complete 360-degree turn to starboard.
Figure 10 – 04 at 0710 hours, vessel already within 3 minutes speed vector range
10.01.04 Before Grounding
In Figure 10-05, taken at 0713 hours—just one minute before grounding—the captain attempts to
redirect the vessel back to the port side, aiming to follow the stern of the outbound vessel, as
illustrated in Figure 10 - 05. However, the captain fails to recognize a fundamental principle of
navigation: a large vessel requires approximately three minutes to complete a turn. This is why we
use three-minute speed vectors to assess whether the own ship has sufficient space to execute a
turn.
In traditional seamanship, the distance covered in three minutes at the current speed is referred to
as the "point of no return." If the distance to be traveled forward is less than the distance that can
be covered in three minutes, the vessel will be unable to turn back from its current heading. Even
with the rudder hard over to port or starboard, the vessel has a minimal chance of avoiding the
island ahead.
This critical understanding should be instinctual for mariners, representing the competence in
seamanship. By employing three-minute speed vectors, as discussed in the previous chapter,
navigators can cultivate a heightened sense of situational awareness. This awareness, enhanced by
radar visualization, is vital for making informed decisions at critical moments.
As we navigate increasingly complex environments, the ability to anticipate the consequences of our
maneuvers becomes paramount. Effective decision-making relies not only on technical skills but also
on a deep understanding of the dynamics of maritime navigation. Ensuring that this knowledge is
Defensive navigation is an essential skill for mariners, involving the awareness and decision-making
required when selecting routes in coastal areas. This process is crucial not only before a vessel
departs the berth but also while navigating congested and narrow passages. Mariners must be able
to anticipate the maneuvering intentions and limitations of their own vessel as well as those of
others, taking the simplest route to evade potential hazards. Navigating these waters presents
unique challenges, where an incorrect choice can lead to serious consequences, including grounding,
collisions, and environmental disasters. This risk is particularly pronounced in high-traffic zones,
where multiple vessels operate in close proximity. To emphasize the importance of defensive
navigation, we will examine two well-documented incidents that occurred in the Singapore Pilot
Eastern Boarding Ground.
The principle of "location, location, location" is a well-known adage in real estate, yet it is equally
applicable to voyage planning. In Electronic Display of Chart Information and Systems (EDCIS)
training, we emphasize the use of "no-go areas" and safety contours to avoid static dangers such as
reefs, shallow waters, and shipwrecks. However, in Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) training,
dynamic danger areas involving movable threats—such as coastal vessels or fishing boats—often
receive insufficient attention. When transiting through narrow channels, navigators may feel as if
they are relying on luck, as there seems to be little they can do to mitigate potential risks.
A prudent navigator exercises extreme caution in collision-prone areas, frequently noting "Call
Captain here" in standing orders, night order books, or on paper charts. However, these collision
prone areas are not always readily identifiable, as the Officer of the Watch (OOW) may become too
focused on the individual collision risks presented by multiple targets simultaneously. Effective
navigation is not merely an art of prediction but also one of anticipation.
In voyage planning, we aim to avoid static navigational hazards. In defensive navigation, we
concentrate on foreseeing the collision risks posed by every potential target and identifying collision
prone areas before our vessel enters them. Let us explore these scenarios further and consider how
we can enhance our navigational practices.
10.01.01 Forced Grounding at Monggok Sebarok reef on September 16, 2009
In the MCA Report No. 2/2010, a notable incident involved a UK-registered container ship that ran
aground on the Monggok Sebarok reef in the Singapore Strait on September 16, 2009. The chain of
events leading to this grounding began when the vessel altered its course to starboard to yield to
three vessels exiting the Jong Channel. This maneuver inadvertently directed the ship towards the
reef. The captain intended to subsequently alter course to port and return to the original planned
track after passing astern of the third vessel. Unfortunately, this decision was executed too late.
Despite receiving multiple warnings from the Singapore Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS), the
vessel did not reduce its speed or alter its course in a timely manner to avoid grounding.
Consequently, the ship sustained substantial damage to its bow, although it is fortunate that there
were no injuries or pollution incidents reported as a result.
Analysis of the Incident
The investigation conducted by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) identified several
critical failures in bridge teamwork that contributed to the incident:
Figure 10 – 01 0703 hours, safe maneuvering for a junior OOW
⚫ Inadequate Passage Planning: The bridge team did not develop a comprehensive plan for the
vessel's passage, which is fundamental to safe navigation.
⚫ Poor Position Monitoring: There was a lack of effective monitoring of the vessel's position
relative to navigational hazards, which is vital in busy coastal waters.
⚫ Ineffective Communication: Interaction among bridge team members was lacking, underpinned
by a sense of complacency about the situation.
In the aftermath of the accident, the shipping company implemented several corrective measures.
They ensured that future navigational audits include examinations of Voyage Data Recorder (VDR)
data as a standard practice. Additionally, all bridge team officers are now required to undergo crew
resource management training, aimed at enhancing teamwork and communication skills.
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) also took action, distributing a circular to its members
emphasizing the lessons learned from recent maritime accidents. The circular strongly supports the
necessity for navigating officers to attend bridge team management training courses. Moreover, the
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) has committed to supporting proposed amendments to
STCW (Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers) requirements,
particularly concerning leadership and management skills in bridge resource management. Given
these proactive steps, the MAIB issued no further safety recommendations.
Historical Context and Educational Implications
This incident, which occurred 15 years ago, is thoroughly detailed in the "Defensive Navigation"
chapter of the BHRM (Bridge Human Resource Management) series.
⚫ A key takeaway from this case is that the essence of BRM (Bridge Resource Management) or
BHRM training lies in the depth of knowledge imparted, rather than merely the labels attached
to training programs.
⚫ At the time of the investigation, BRM was promoted as an effective solution for enhancing
navigation safety; however, this perception proved to be misleading.
⚫ If BRM were truly effective in preventing such incidents, we would not have witnessed the
collision of an American naval vessel with a merchant ship in Japan and Singapore coastal
waters in June and August 2017. While BRM is regarded as an American standard in shipping,
British perspectives often attribute incidents and accidents to human factors.
The overarching message remains clear: without knowledge, there can be no awareness. Knowledge
must precede all else in the realm of maritime navigation.
10.01.02 Dynamic Navigation Prediction
As prudent navigators often say, "Navigation is an art of prediction." Just as a captain should be
aware of an impending storm, they must also maintain a keen prediction of collision risks. This
awareness stems from knowledge, which is paramount in maritime navigation. Even when target
vessels are still within the harbor, it is crucial for a captain to understand their potential next ports of
call.
Utilizing AIS (Automatic Identification System) data to determine a vessel's next destination is a
prudent practice for junior officers to adopt, even without prompting from senior captains.
However, it's important to note that the AIS port of call may not always be updated at the time of
their departure. Additionally, a vessel's actual position or route at harboar can often provide
valuable insights into its intentions, enabling navigators to make informed decisions without relying
solely on AIS data or VHF verbal communication.
In Figure 10-01, we observe the situation at 0703 hours, where the own ship is heading southwest at
a speed of 20 knots. The Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) has announced three outbound vessels,
excluding the last one. The captain is navigating toward the stern of the first outbound vessel, which
is typically a prudent maneuver for a junior Officer of the Watch (OOW), provided they understand
the implications of crossing speed vectors.
Figure 10 – 02, in the trouble waters of multi direction traffic flow
However, the situation becomes complex as this vessel approaches the precaution area near the
eastbound channel. With only one vessel outbound, standard maneuvering protocol would suggest
gradually altering course toward the target vessel’s stern to ensure safe navigation.
⚫ It is crucial for the navigator to recognize that with three vessels departing in succession, each
spaced one nautical mile apart, this distance is a common safety standard in controlled
waterways. Such spacing, overseen by VTS or canal authorities, is essential for managing
inbound and outbound traffic effectively. Navigators should be capable of transiting between
two vessels that are one nautical mile apart.
⚫ For a prudent seaman, the passage plan for eastbound vessels heading toward the Far East
typically positions their course close to the eastern side of the outbound fairway within the
harbor limits, represented by the pink-colored route. This strategy aims to minimize crossing
into the precautionary area and to avoid conflicts with vessels inbound from the eastbound
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) lane.
⚫ In Figure 10-02, the outbound fairway is segmented into three distinct colored paths, each
designed to facilitate rapid transit through the precaution area while minimizing encounters
with crossing and end-on traffic. The pink path, positioned closest to the eastern side of the
fairway, aims to mitigate conflicts with vessels inbound from the south and those approaching
from the southeast.
⚫ This pink path effectively minimizes the area utilized within the precaution area, directing
vessels eastward, which aligns with the general flow towards the Far East, as illustrated by the
M.V. "Ace Dragon."
⚫ The yellow path is intended for transiting the precautionary area at a right angle, optimizing for
speed and efficiency, although this traffic is relatively rare.
⚫ By analyzing the speed vectors of the outbound vessels, their navigational intentions within the
precaution area become clearer. The M.V. "Kota Delima" is heading toward the eastbound lane,
consistent with the trajectory indicated by the pink path.
⚫ Meanwhile, the position of the M.V. "Bright Pacific," situated on the western side of the
fairway, raises questions about her intentions. Is she preparing to wait, or will she proceed
westbound? The uncertainty regarding her actions necessitates vigilant monitoring.
Figure 10 - 03 0708 hours, vessel steady on same course for next outbound vessel
Even in Figure 10-01, it is evident that the "Ace Dragon" (indicated by the black arrow as her speed
vector) does not pose a collision threat at this distance, even with the own ship’s speed of 20 knots
(shown by the green arrow). The "Ace Dragon" is safely three minutes away from the green speed
vector of the "Maersk Kendal," indicating that there is no immediate risk of collision.
10.01.03 Situational Awareness by Dynamic Prediction.
At 0703 hours, as illustrated in Figure 10-01, what course should the "Maersk Kendal" take? A skilled
navigator must be able to predict the vessel's position after three or six minutes based on its current
speed vector, which includes both course and speed. Similarly, it is essential to forecast where the
"Ace Dragon" will be after the same time frame, utilizing the speed vector displayed in AIS or ARPA.
By employing the three or six-minute speed vectors for both vessels, we can determine that if the
"Ace Dragon" maintains its current course and speed, it will have already entered the westbound
lane. As a result, the "Maersk Kendal" does not need to give way to the "Ace Dragon" and can safely
remain centered in the westbound lane.
However, our attention must now turn to the next two outbound vessels. Specifically, we need to
assess the situation regarding the second vessel, the "Kota Delima." We can similarly ascertain the
position of these vessels after six minutes by using their six-minute speed vectors. To determine our
course of action concerning the "Kota Delima," we should apply the radar lookout skills previously
utilized for the "Ace Dragon." This involves closely monitoring her speed vector to evaluate her
trajectory and speed, which will inform our navigational decisions.
By the time we reach Figure 10-04 at 0710 hours, the "Maersk Kendal" is on a course of 274 degrees
at a speed of 19 knots, moving further to starboard compared to the third outbound vessel, the
"Bright Pacific," which was on a course of 265 degrees just two minutes earlier. This misjudgment
may have resulted from distractions caused by VTS communications with the captain. At this point,
the navigational options are limited: the vessel can either execute a quick turn to cross the bow of
the "Bright Pacific" or perform a complete 360-degree turn to starboard.
Figure 10 – 04 at 0710 hours, vessel already within 3 minutes speed vector range
10.01.04 Before Grounding
In Figure 10-05, taken at 0713 hours—just one minute before grounding—the captain attempts to
redirect the vessel back to the port side, aiming to follow the stern of the outbound vessel, as
illustrated in Figure 10 - 05. However, the captain fails to recognize a fundamental principle of
navigation: a large vessel requires approximately three minutes to complete a turn. This is why we
use three-minute speed vectors to assess whether the own ship has sufficient space to execute a
turn.
In traditional seamanship, the distance covered in three minutes at the current speed is referred to
as the "point of no return." If the distance to be traveled forward is less than the distance that can
be covered in three minutes, the vessel will be unable to turn back from its current heading. Even
with the rudder hard over to port or starboard, the vessel has a minimal chance of avoiding the
island ahead.
This critical understanding should be instinctual for mariners, representing the competence in
seamanship. By employing three-minute speed vectors, as discussed in the previous chapter,
navigators can cultivate a heightened sense of situational awareness. This awareness, enhanced by
radar visualization, is vital for making informed decisions at critical moments.
As we navigate increasingly complex environments, the ability to anticipate the consequences of our
maneuvers becomes paramount. Effective decision-making relies not only on technical skills but also
on a deep understanding of the dynamics of maritime navigation. Ensuring that this knowledge is
