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Chapter 9 Navigation Safety in Port
9.1.1 案例研究：良好的航海技術與交通管理
在人生的歷程中，有時會發生突如其來的問題，進而引發無法避免的事故。當我們回顧時，會發現某些行動原本能有所幫助，但在當下我們卻沒能想到。研讀此案例的最佳方式，是請教讀者您：如果您身處當時的情境，您會怎麼做？
這起碰撞事故為全球航運界帶來了巨大的難題。人們對於事故原因存在兩種截然不同的觀點，這可能會引發更多混淆，並增加未來的航行風險。英國海事事故調查局（MAIB）報告（i）深入檢視了船舶的實際操作方式；然而，海事法院（ii）則僅著重於法律規則，藉此判定責任歸屬。
圖 9.1 2342 時之碰撞位置
事故經過
2015 年 2 月 11 日，阿拉伯聯合大公國傑貝阿里港（Jebel Ali Port）浮標航道入口附近發生了一起嚴重的船舶碰撞事故。英國籍貨櫃船「長智輪」（Ever Smart）正以 12 節（船舶速度單位）的速度駛離港口，且已讓引水人（協助指引船舶的在地專家）離船。該船撞上了馬紹爾群島籍的油輪「亞歷山大 1 號」（Alexandra 1）。當時該油輪正以極慢的速度準備進港，等待剛從貨櫃船離船的引水人。兩艘船的船艉/船艏（前段）均遭受嚴重損傷，但幸運的是，無人受傷，亦未造成水域污染。
如圖 9.1 所示，此事故發生於傑貝阿里港管轄的區域內。通常情況下，港口的引水規章及其船舶交通管理系統（VTS）有助於協調船舶動態並防止問題發生。然而，這次這些安全措施卻未能發揮作用。
9.1.2 僅在接獲港口管制台警示前數秒才察覺危險
「亞歷山大 1 號」的船長聽到了一段原本發給他船的甚高頻（VHF）無線電訊息。他誤解了該訊息，並將油輪操縱至離浮標航道入口過近的位置。這對出港的「長智輪」造成了巨大的危險：油輪正以極慢的速度阻擋航道，且沒有容易避讓的途徑。
「長智輪」的船長完全沒料到在距離航道入口僅 4 鏈（約 0.7 公里）處會有一艘慢速航行的船舶阻擋其出口路徑。他只有 8 分鐘的時間來察覺風險並採取緊急避讓操縱。更雪上加霜的是，他的船隻在減速讓引水人離船時，已向左（港側/左舷）大幅漂移。為了回到安全水域，他增加了航速並向右（舷側/右舷）轉向 5 度，以抵銷風流影響（稱為風壓差/流壓差 Leeway）。
這起碰撞是由多個問題相互作用所導致。重要的是，兩艘船並未就如何安全會船達成一致或進行溝通。兩位船長均基於錯誤的猜測採取行動。「亞歷山大 1 號」過於接近航道入口，且其船長使用了來自無線電的錯誤資訊。此外，「長智輪」駕駛台團隊並未做好目視瞭望，也未利用雷達追蹤油輪。「長智輪」僅在撞擊前數秒——接獲港口管制台的警告後——才注意到正前方的「亞歷山大 1 號」。在安全航行中，您必須時刻留意來自所有船舶的碰撞風險，並在進入危險區域前即發現潛在危機。
9.1.3 因過早抵達航道入口附近而感到焦慮
事故時間軸
於 2312 時（碰撞前 30 分鐘），「亞歷山大 1 號」船長在雷達上看到「長智輪」通過 8 號浮標。他使用自動雷達測繪板（ARPA）來監視該貨櫃船的動態。他知道「長智輪」不會很快駛離航道，因此於 2314 時（碰撞前 28 分鐘），他將主機指令由「微進（dead slow ahead）」調整為「停車（stop）」。油輪此時正往東向漂移，距離 1 號浮標約 1.3 海浬（約 2.4 公里）。這個位置讓船長感到焦慮，因為他比預期更早抵達了航道入口附近。
預估「長智輪」抵達時間以規劃動態
於 2256 時，在與船舶交通服務員（VTSO – 協助管理船舶交通的人員）進行 VHF 無線電通話時，「亞歷山大 1 號」船長得知「長智輪」位於 12 號浮標。他使用以下方法計算了該貨櫃船預計抵達引水站的時間（ETA）：
從 12 號浮標至 1 號浮標的距離：
測得為 9.25 海浬（nm – 海上距離單位，約 15.3 公里）。這是透過將每個浮標間 0.75 海浬的間距（於 ECDIS 或紙本海圖上確認）乘以 11（12 號與 1 號浮標之間的間距數量）計算得出。
前往 1 號浮標的航行時間：
以「長智輪」12 節的航速（傑貝阿里港規定的限速）計算，公式為：(0.75×11×60)/12=41 分鐘。
計算得出之抵達時間：
將 41 分鐘加上 2256 時，「長智輪」預計將於 2337 時抵達 1 號浮標——比原計劃的引水人登艦時間 2315 時晚了 22 分鐘。
這 22 分鐘的延誤意味著「亞歷山大 1 號」船長本可以在 2256 時就減慢速度——而不是等到接近引水站時才減速。這原本可以防止他過早且過於接近航道入口。
良好航海技術的啟示：在安全區域內預先規劃船舶位置，展現了船長良好的前瞻思維。對局勢做出準確的預測有助於在問題發生前就解決問題。這是卓越航海技術（安全且熟練的操船能力）的核心。
9.2 消除 BHRM 中的不確定性：減速或停車
9.2.1 當我們的心智在等待隱性線索時？？
於 2319 時，「亞歷山大 1 號」船長利用 VHF 無線電呼叫傑貝阿里港口管制台，以確認引水軟梯（供引水人登船的梯子）的配置規定。此時，該油輪距離 1 號浮標 1.058 海浬（約 1.96 公里），對地航向為 126 度，對地航速為 2.2 節（慢速）。
「亞歷山大 1 號」的環境意識狀態：
船長已經停車，但船舶仍有 2.2 節的對地航速。
在還需要等待 12 分鐘的情況下（直到預計「長智輪」於 2337抵達 1 號浮標），以 2.2 節的速度航行，距離 1 號浮標的距離將從 1.058 海浬下降到 0.618 海浬（約 1.1 公里，或 6 鏈）。這樣短的距離無法為出港船提供足夠的空間來進行大幅度的轉灣。
於 2328 時，「亞歷山大 1 號」的主機指令被設定為「微進」。一分鐘後，於 2329 時，拖船「Zakheer Bravo」利用 VHF 無線電呼叫傑貝阿里港口管制台。該拖船請求允許穿過引水人登艦區域。該拖船及其拖帶的船隻位於 1 號浮標以西 1.3 海浬（約 2.4 公里）處（參見圖 9.2）。他們正向東駛往朱美拉（Jumeirah），途經傑貝阿里。VTSO 詢問拖船船長：「你看得見正在等待的那艘大油輪嗎？」拖船船長表示看得見，VTSO 便指示他「從該油輪後方 1 海浬（約 1.85 公里）處穿越」。
「亞歷山大 1 號」船長聽到了這段無線電對話的一部分，並以為港口管制台是在對「長智輪」說話。他推測為了從其船隻後方通過，「長智輪」會在離開航道後向左（左舷）轉向。該船長並未向任何人核實以確認是哪艘船正在接收 VTSO 的指令。
「亞歷山大 1 號」的環境意識分析：
基於片段資訊做出錯誤猜測： 船長的第一個錯誤是認為港口管制台正在與「長智輪」通話。他僅基於聽到的部分 VHF 無線電訊息做出此判斷。如此依賴來自他人的資訊導致了重大錯誤。
未核實由誰應答： 第二個錯誤是沒有核實是哪艘船在回覆 VTSO。他只注意到符合自己預想的細節，而忽略了其他無線電通話。這不一定總是源於疏忽，而是源於未時刻收聽 VHF 無線電頻道的壞習慣（不佳的無線電聽守）。
未與他人確認： 第三個錯誤是沒有向對方船舶或自己的值班航行員（OOW – 在駕駛台上協助的人員）進行確認。原因可能包括語言障礙（英語能力較弱）、聽力問題、缺乏自信、團隊合作欠佳、駕駛台人力資源管理（BHRM – 駕駛台團隊如何協同工作）系統薄弱，或者公司未制定要求 OOW 協助無線電聽守的規定。
對「長智輪」動態的錯誤猜測： 船長假設「長智輪」在駛離航道後會向左轉以從其船後通過。他在未經核實的情況下做出了這個猜測，且這違背了正常的避碰規則。
違反優先通行權規則： 根據《傑貝阿里港交通管制手冊》，當出港船與進港船在同一地點交會時，出港船擁有優先通行權。透過做相反的猜測，「亞歷山大 1 號」船長犯下了第四個重大錯誤，進而導致了事故的發生。
人為不確定性與偏見的作用： 不確定性往往會將人為失誤帶入海難事故中。當我們清晰的思考（意識層面）在等待隱含的想法（潛意識層面）時——就像在等待提示來解開數學難題一樣——混淆就會發生。在此案例中：
清晰思考： 船長清楚地聽到了拖船與 VTSO 之間的通話。
潛意識影響： 在內心深處，船長希望「長智輪」能夠讓路。這是因為他的船隻過於接近引水站，導致難以平順地轉向進入航道。這種隱性願望的主要原因，在於失去了對抵達時間的控制，或是未對引水站附近的他船進行預先規劃（缺乏防禦性航行 – 未留意前方危險）。
消除不確定性： 為了擺脫失去控制和仓促做出錯誤決策的壓力，船長切不應過早抵達引水站。這是從事故研究中獲得的關鍵教訓。這有助於減少不確定性、壓力、錯誤猜測以及恐懼。
在良好航海技術中，有兩條主要規則：第一，在船舶預計前往的方向上減速，除非您 100% 確定沒有風險。第二，如果您對接下來會發生的事情不確定，請在原地停車。
如圖 9.2 所示，於 2329 時，拖船「Zakheer Bravo」與「亞歷山大 1 號」處於危險位置：
隱性的應對方式： 在內心深處，「亞歷山大 1 號」船長透過猜測出港船會讓路來解決他的操縱難題。這個猜測讓他感到較為安心，並得以維持在原位。
忽略核實： 這個猜測使他跳過了向 VTSO 詢問哪艘船收到何種指令的步驟。他可能擔心提出詢問會導致收到難以執行的指令。
高風險選擇： 他選擇等待的決定就短期操縱而言似乎較為輕鬆，但卻大大增加了碰撞的風險。當時，他似乎並未過多考慮碰撞危險。然而，在剛好位於出港航道外側的位置，船長應始終對碰撞風險保持高度警惕。
圖 9.2 2329 時之拖船 ”Zakheer Bravo“ 與亞歷山大 1 號
9.2.2 將您的船舶控制在安全的航向、航速與位置
如圖 9.6 所示，對於需要引水人的進港船而言，正確的等待位置是在引水站標誌右側（右舷正橫方向）4 鏈（約 0.7 公里）處。這個位置正是「亞歷山大 1 號」於 2315 時所處的位置——即該船原計劃讓引水人登船的時間。
引水人登船的兩難困境
2315 時的位置是接載引水人的絕佳區域。這與 VTSO 告知「亞歷山大 1 號」船長的登船時間相符。
船長過於專注於 2200 時接獲的指令。在該指令中，VTSO 要求於 2315 時抵達 1 號浮標（引水站）。「亞歷山大 1 號」準時抵達，但引水船卻不在那裡。
引水人未能在 2315 時趕到，為船長帶來了巨大的心理壓力。他必須在額外的 30 分鐘內保持對船舶位置與船首向（heading）的控制。
對於船長來說，更明智的選擇是與 1 號浮標保持安全距離。這將使得稍後接載引水人變得更加容易。
如果「亞歷山大 1 號」船長一直保持在 2315 時的位置直到 2342 時：
他將不需要猜測出港船通過 1 號浮標後的動態。
出港船將有更多空間駛離且不受阻擋。
兩艘船都能更容易地遵守 COLREGs（國際海上避碰規則 – 避免船舶碰撞的全球性規則）。
不良的等待位置會帶來額外的壓力。
然而，VTSO 告知「亞歷山大 1 號」船長在 1 號浮標接載引水人。船長原本應該做的是與 1 號浮標保持安全距離，直到引水船出來。2333 時的位置——位於引水站標誌東南方 0.5 海浬（約 0.9 公里）處——是等待引水人的最後良好位置。
對於操船關鍵要素（如航向、航速或位置）的任何疑慮，都會為船長帶來隱性的壓力（潛意識壓力）。
船長應經常檢查這些要素以減輕自己的壓力。
他應將目視瞭望的工作交給值班航行員（OOW），並由自己不時進行抽查。
9.2.3 堅定主張（Assertive）是我們的責任擔當
船長不應害羞而不去詢問 VTSO，而是可以運用其權限來修正基於聽聞他人訊息而產生的錯誤觀念。
透過詢問：「傑貝阿里港口管制台，這是亞歷山大 1 號呼叫。請確認您的指令：長智輪是否從亞歷山大 1 號艉部 1 海浬處穿越？請回覆。」
船長的權威源於其對現場局勢的專業瞭解以及自己船舶的特殊需求。岸上的 VTSO 可能無法完全掌握這些情況。
「港務長（Harbour Master）」是一個專業頭銜，與「船長（Marine Master）」的職責並不相同。
我們應該將自身的安全放在首位，不要被港口當局不明確的指令所混淆。船舶交通服務（VTS）是航海人員的輔助工具。如果有任何疑慮，船長應立即向相關人員要求澄清。
9.2.4 通訊鏈中缺失的環節
表 9.1 2331 時引水人與長智輪船長之間的對話
(圖片由傑貝阿里港提供)
9.1 BHRM in collision avoidance
9.1.1 Case study Seamanship and Traffic Management
In the story of life, there are times when a surprise problem happens, leading to an accident that cannot be stopped. When we look back, we see that some actions could have helped, but we did not think of them in the moment. The best way to study this case is to ask you, the reader: What would you do if you were in that situation?
This collision has created a big problem for the world of shipping. People have two very different views on what caused it. This can cause more confusion and increase risks in the future. The MAIB report (i) looked closely at how the ships were operated. But the Admiralty Court (ii) only focused on legal rules to decide who was at fault.
Figure 9.1 Collision position at 2342 hours
The Incident Account
On 11 February 2015, a serious ship collision happened near the entrance to the buoyed channel at Jebel Ali Port in the United Arab Emirates. The UK-registered container ship, Ever Smart, was leaving the port at 12 knots (a speed unit for ships) and had already sent away its pilot (a local expert who helps guide the ship). It hit the Marshall Islands-registered oil tanker, Alexandra 1. The tanker was entering the port very slowly, waiting for the pilot who had just left the container ship. Both ships had bad damage to their front parts (bows), but luckily, no one was hurt, and there was no pollution in the water.
As shown in Figure 9.1, this accident happened inside the area controlled by Jebel Ali Port. Normally, the port's rules for pilots and its system to manage ship traffic help organize movements and stop problems. But this time, these safety steps did not work.
9.1.2 Aware Only Seconds Before the Collision When Alerted by Port Control
The captain of Alexandra 1 heard a VHF radio message (a type of ship radio) that was meant for another ship. He misunderstood it and moved his tanker too close to the entrance of the buoyed channel. This created a big danger for the outgoing Ever Smart: the tanker was moving very slowly and blocking the way, with no easy path to avoid it.
The captain of Ever Smart did not expect a slow-moving ship to block his exit path, just 4 cables (about 0.7 kilometers) from the channel entrance. He had only 8 minutes to see the risk and make emergency moves to avoid it. To make it harder, his ship had drifted a lot to the left (port side) while slowing down to drop off the pilot. He also needed to get back to safe water, so he increased speed and changed course 5 degrees to the right (starboard) to fight against wind and current effects (called leeway).
The collision happened because of many problems working together. Importantly, the two ships did not agree or talk about how to pass each other safely. Both captains acted based on wrong guesses. Alexandra 1 got too close to the channel entrance, and its captain used bad information from the radio. Also, the team on Ever Smart's bridge did not watch well with their eyes or use radar to track the tanker. Ever Smart only saw that Alexandra 1 was right in front seconds before the crash—after a warning from port control. In safe navigation, you must watch for collision risks from all ships and spot danger areas before you enter them.
9.1.3 Upset About Arriving Too Early Near the Channel Entrance
The Incident Timeline
At 2312 (30 minutes before the collision), the captain of Alexandra 1 saw Ever Smart passing Buoy No. 8 on his radar. He used the Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) to watch the container ship's movement. He knew Ever Smart would not leave the channel quickly, so at 2314 (28 minutes before the collision), he changed the engine order from "dead slow ahead" (very slow forward) to "stop." The tanker was now drifting on an easterly direction (toward the east), about 1.3 nautical miles (about 2.4 kilometers) from Buoy No. 1. This position upset the captain, because he had arrived near the channel entrance earlier than needed.
Estimating Ever Smart’s Arrival Time to Plan Moves
At 2256 hours, during a VHF radio talk with the Vessel Traffic Service Operator (VTSO – a person who helps manage ship traffic), the captain of Alexandra 1 learned that Ever Smart was at Buoy No. 12. He calculated the container ship's estimated time of arrival (ETA) at the pilot station using this method:
- Distance from Buoy No. 12 to No. 1:
Measured as 9.25 nautical miles (nm – a unit for sea distance, about 15.3 kilometers). This came from multiplying the 0.75-nm gap between each buoy (checked on ECDIS – or on a paper chart) by 11 (the number of gaps between Buoy 12 and 1) - Travel Time to Buoy No. 1:
At Ever Smart’s speed of 12 knots (Jebel Ali’s required speed limit), the formula was: (0.75 × 11 × 60) / 12 minutes = 41 minutes. - Calculated Arrival Time:
Adding 41 minutes to 2256 hours, Ever Smart was expected to reach Buoy No. 1 at 2337 hours – 22 minutes later than the planned pilot-boarding time of 2315 hours.
This 22-minute delay meant the captain of Alexandra 1 could have slowed down at 2256 hours – instead of waiting until close to the pilot station. This would have stopped him from getting too close to the channel entrance too soon.
Seamanship Insight: Planning where to place your ship in safe areas shows a captain's good thinking ahead. Making accurate predictions about the situation helps solve problems before they start. This is the heart of strong seamanship (safe and skilled ship handling).
9.2 Avoid Uncertainty in BHRM: Slow down or stop
9.2.1 When Our Mind Waits for Hidden Clues ?？
At 2319, the captain of Alexandra 1 called Jebel Ali port control on VHF radio (a type of ship radio) to check the rules for the pilot ladder (a ladder used to board the pilot). By this time, the tanker was 1.058 nautical miles (about 1.96 kilometers) from Buoy No. 1. It was moving on a course over the ground of 126 degrees at 2.2 knots (a slow speed).
Situational awareness of “Alexandra 1” is:
- The captain had stopped the engine, but the ship still had a speed over the ground of 2.2 knots.
- With another 12 minutes of waiting (until Ever Smart was expected at Buoy No. 1 at 2337), at 2.2 knots, the distance to Buoy No. 1 would drop from 1.058 nm to 0.618 nm (about 1.1 kilometers, or 6 cables – a sea distance unit). This short distance would not give enough room for a sharp turn by an outgoing ship.
At 2328, Alexandra 1's engine order was set to "dead slow ahead" (very slow forward). One minute later, at 2329, the tugboat Zakheer Bravo called Jebel Ali port control on VHF radio. The tug asked for permission to cross the pilot boarding area. The tug and its towed boat were 1.3 nm (about 2.4 kilometers) west of Buoy No. 1 (see Figure 9.2). They were heading east to Jumeirah, past Jebel Ali. The VTSO (Vessel Traffic Service Operator – a person who helps manage ship traffic) asked the tug's captain, "Can you see the big tanker waiting?" The tug's captain said yes, and the VTSO told him to "cross 1 nm (about 1.85 kilometers) behind the tanker."
The captain of Alexandra 1 heard part of this radio talk and thought port control was speaking to Ever Smart. He guessed that to pass behind his ship, Ever Smart would turn left (to port) after leaving the channel. The captain did not check with anyone to confirm which ship was getting the instructions from the VTSO.
Situational awareness of “Alexandra” 1:
- Wrong Guess from Partial Information: The captain's first mistake was thinking port control was talking to Ever Smart. He based this on only part of the VHF radio message he heard. Relying on information from others like this led to a big error.
- Did Not Check Who Was Answering: The second mistake was not verifying which ship was replying to the VTSO. He only paid attention to details that matched his own ideas and ignored other radio talks. This was not always from carelessness, but from a bad habit of not always listening to the VHF radio channel (poor radio watch).
- No Confirmation with Others: The third mistake was not asking the other ship or his own Officer of the Watch (OOW – the person helping on the bridge) to confirm. Reasons for this could include language problems (weak English skills), hearing issues, low confidence, poor teamwork, a weak Bridge Human Resource Management (BHRM – how the bridge team works together) system, or no company rules requiring the OOW to help with radio listening.
- Bad Guess About Ever Smart's Move: The captain assumed Ever Smart would turn left after leaving the channel to pass behind his ship. He made this guess without checking, and it went against normal sea rules.
- Breaking Right-of-Way Rules: According to the Jebel Ali Harbour Traffic Control Manual, when an outgoing ship leaves the channel at the same spot where an incoming ship enters, the outgoing ship has the right to go first. By guessing the opposite, the captain of Alexandra 1 made a fourth big mistake, which helped cause the accident.
- The Role of Human Uncertainty and Bias: Uncertainty often adds human mistakes to sea accidents. Confusion happens when our clear thinking (conscious mind) waits for hidden ideas (subconscious mind), like waiting for hints to solve a math puzzle. In this case:
① Clear Thinking: The captain clearly heard the talk between the tugboat and the VTSO.
② Hidden Influence: Deep down, the captain wanted Ever Smart to give way. This came from his ship being too close to the pilot station, making it hard to turn smoothly into the channel. The main reason for this hidden wish was losing control of his arrival time or not planning for other ships near the pilot station (no defensive navigation – not watching for dangers ahead).
③ Avoiding Uncertainty: To escape the stress of losing control and making quick wrong decisions, captains should not arrive at the pilot station too early. This is a key lesson from studying accidents. It helps reduce uncertainty, pressure, wrong guesses, and fear.
In seamanship (safe and skilled ship handling), there are two main rules. First, slow down where your ship should go, unless you are 100% sure there is no risk. Second, stop where you are if you are not sure what will happen next.
As shown in Figure 9.2, at 2329, the tugboat Zakheer Bravo and Alexandra 1 were in a dangerous spot:
- Hidden Way to Cope: Deep down, the captain of Alexandra 1 solved his moving problem by guessing the outgoing ship would give way. This guess made him feel better and let him stay in place.
- Ignored Checking: This guess made him skip asking the VTSO which ship was being told what to do. He might have been afraid that asking would lead to hard instructions to follow.
- Risky Choice: His decision to wait seemed easier for short-term moving, but it greatly raised the chance of a collision. At that time, he did not seem to think much about collision danger. But in a spot just outside the outgoing channel, a captain should always stay very alert to collision risks.
Figure 9.2 Tug boat ” Zakheer Bravo “ and Alexandra 1 at 2329
9.2.2 Handle Your Ship in a Safe Direction, Speed, and Position
As shown in Figure 9.6, the correct waiting spot for an incoming ship that needs a pilot is 4 cables (about 0.7 kilometers – a sea distance unit) to the right side (starboard beam) of the pilot station markers. This spot is exactly where Alexandra 1 was at 2315 hours – the ship's planned time for the pilot to board.
The Pilot Boarding Dilemma
The position at 2315 hours is a perfect area for picking up the pilot. It matches the boarding time that the VTSO told Alexandra 1's captain.
The captain focused too much on the instructions from 2200 hours. In those, the VTSO said to reach Buoy No. 1 (the pilot station) at 2315 hours. Alexandra 1 arrived on time, but the pilot boat was not there.
The pilot not coming at 2315 hours added a lot of mental stress to the captain. He had to keep the ship's position and direction (heading) under control for an extra 30 minutes.
A smarter choice for the captain would have been to stay a safe distance away from Buoy No. 1. This would make it easier to board the pilot later.
If the captain of Alexandra 1 had stayed in the 2315 hours position until 2342 hours:
- He would not need to guess what the outgoing ship would do after passing Buoy No. 1.
- The outgoing ship would have more space to leave without any block.
- Both ships could follow COLREGs (International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea – global rules to avoid ship crashes) more easily.
A bad waiting spot creates extra stress.
However, the VTSO told the captain of Alexandra 1 to board the pilot at Buoy No. 1. What the captain should have done was keep a safe distance from Buoy No. 1 until the pilot boat came out. The position at 2333 hours – 0.5 nautical miles (about 0.9 kilometers) southeast of the pilot station marker – was the last good spot to wait for the pilot.
- Any doubt about key parts of ship handling, like direction (heading), speed, or position, will create hidden stress (subconscious pressure) for the captain.
- The captain should check these parts often to reduce his own stress.
- He should give the job of watching with eyes (visual lookout) to the Officer of the Watch (OOW) and check it himself from time to time.
9.2.3 Assertive is our accountability
Instead of feeling shy to ask the VTSO, the captain can use his authority to fix a wrong idea based on information heard from others.
- By asking, “Jebel Ali port control, this is Alexandra 1 calling. Please confirm your order: Is it correct that Ever Smart is to cross 1 nm astern of Alexandra 1? Over.”
- The captain’s authority comes from his expert knowledge of the situation and the special needs of his own ship. These may not be fully known to the VTSO on shore.
- “Harbour master” is a professional title, not the same as the job of a marine master.
We should put our own safety first and not get confused by unclear orders from port authorities. The VTS (Vessel Traffic Service) is a help for sailors. If there is any confusion, the captain should ask for quick clarifications from the right people.
9.2.4 Missing Part in Communication Chain
Table 9.1 Conversation Between the Pilot and Ever Smart’s Captain at 2331
(Image courtesy of Jebel Ali Port)
At 2331 hours (see Figure 9.3), as Ever Smart was nearing Buoy No. 3, the pilot and the captain talked about the pilot leaving the ship (Table 9.1). The pilot gave clear instructions to Ever Smart’s captain about what to do after he left. The pilot and the captain seemed to understand the situation the same way. However, Alexandra 1’s captain was not told where to wait or what Ever Smart planned to do after leaving the channel.
- “So captain, the time has come for me to go. Just follow the channel”: According to the Jebel Ali port rules, as an outgoing ship, Ever Smart had the “right of way” over the incoming Alexandra 1. This matched common sense and safe ship handling practices.
- “the time has come for me to go”: The pilot may have been watching the incoming ship’s movement for a while. Only when Ever Smart reached Buoy No. 3 did the pilot think it was close enough to leave and go to the incoming ship. It is not clear if the pilot told the captain that he was about to board the incoming ship. Did the captain notice a ship was near the pilot station?
- “Just follow the channel”: The pilot told the captain to stay in the channel but did not say where to exit it. Usually, the channel entrance is more dangerous than the channel itself, but the pilot did not seem to think about this.
- The pilot did not warn the captain about the incoming ship because he thought the outgoing ship had the “right of way”.
- Master: “Do you think I can go myself?” The captain was worried if letting the pilot leave at Buoy No. 3 followed port rules.
- The pilot’s choice to leave the outgoing ship was based on his view of the incoming ship’s distance.
Figure 9.3 Radar Picture of Ever Smart when pilot and master discussed pilot’s disembarkation
The incoming ship was 0.5 nm south of the pilot boarding mark on the chart, or 0.75 nm from Buoy No. 1. The outgoing ship was nearing Buoy No. 3. The distance between the two ships was about 2.5 nm (the gap between two buoys in a row was 0.75 nm)..
- If the captain had known the pilot's plan, he would have seen the incoming ship at 2 nm away. He could then have watched it using eyes or radar.
Pilot: “Yes, yes. There is this coming now. There is just the one ship. Only this tanker.” The pilot did not know the incoming ship's name. He just said “One tanker coming now” in three short parts without using the name “Alexandra 1”. This was a bad habit for the pilot and the outgoing ship's captain. It left them without a clear idea of which ship he would board. In an emergency, the pilot could not call the ship well on VHF radio.
- With Ever Smart moving at 12.9 knots over the ground, covering 2.5 nm would take 11.6 minutes. Pilot boats usually go slower than 12 knots. There would not be enough time for a pilot to climb up and down ladders on two big ships and reach their bridges as the ships got close. This meant the two ships would meet in the channel without a pilot on either one. This was not good for port operations.
- If the incoming ship had come too close to Buoy No. 1, the VTSO should have warned it to stay clear.
- As the captain of an incoming ship, you must know that your ship's position can affect outgoing ships.
Master: Yes. Yes. Mr. Mr. pilot had said one vessel although it is not very clear..
- The captain of Ever Smart did not ask about the incoming ship's name, course, speed, or position.
- How could the captain be happy with the pilot’s unclear words? The answer is in the radar screen in Figure 9.3. When the pilot talked about an incoming ship, everyone's eyes went to the long-trail target on the right front (starboard bow), not Alexandra 1 on the left front (port bow), which was marked on the screen. The captain of Ever Smart must have thought the fast-moving incoming ship (the long-trail target) was the one the pilot meant. That is why he asked no more questions.
Pilot: It’s coming. It will wait.... Anyway I go there before ....okay, captain.
- It’s coming.
- The captain of Ever Smart did not ask about the incoming ship's name, course, speed, or position.
- How could the captain be happy with the pilot’s unclear words? The answer is in the radar screen in Figure 9.3. When the pilot talked about an incoming ship, everyone's eyes went to the long-trail target on the right front (starboard bow), not Alexandra 1 on the left front (port bow), which was marked on the screen. The captain of Ever Smart must have thought the fast-moving incoming ship (the long-trail target) was the one the pilot meant. That is why he asked no more questions.
- It will wait....
- The pilot was guessing about the incoming ship’s plans, but he had no real knowledge if it would wait or move.
- He was basically calming himself but did not tell the incoming ship to stop.
- Anyway I go there before ....
- The pilot thought he could control things by going to the incoming ship sooner.
- okay captain.
- If “OK Captain” had been a question, not an order to accept the situation, the captain could have shared his view and asked the pilot to keep guiding the ship out safely.
- But the captain may have given up being firm because he thought the ship on the right side was the one the pilot meant.
The pilot gave Ever Smart’s captain clear instructions on what to do after he left, as below.
- “Just follow the channel.”
- But words like “There is this coming now. There is just the one ship. Only this tanker.” and “It will wait.... Anyway I go there before” left out key details.
- The pilot did not know the incoming ship’s name, and Ever Smart did not know its distance, direction, course, or speed.
- Based only on his guess, Ever Smart's captain thought he understood the situation
- There is this coming now. There is just the one ship. Only this tanker.
- It will wait.... Anyway I go there before.
- Pilot did not know the incoming ship's name. The incoming ship's distance, direction, course, or speed were not known by Ever Smart. Yet, Ever Smart's captain thought he understood the situation.
- From these talks between the pilot and the captain, it was clear they did not agree.
- The pilot had Alexandra 1 in mind, while Ever Smart's captain may have been looking at another ship on the right side, not the one right ahead.
- Asking the pilot to point out the incoming ship on the radar screen would have fixed this easily.
- As shown in Figure 9.3, there were no ARPA-tracked targets. When the pilot talked about an incoming ship, he could not point it out to the captain by target number.
- Also, Alexandra 1’s radar echo looked like an anchored ship, and it did not send AIS data as required by SOLAS.
The communication process goes from the sender’s mind to the sender’s mouth, then to the receiver’s ear, and finally to the receiver’s mind. Usually, the weakest part is from the sender’s mouth to the receiver’s ear. This part needs extra checks or references to avoid mistakes about what is being talked about. Asking “Show me which ship is the incoming one on the radar screen” is an important extra check to stop such errors.
