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Chapter 9 Navigation Safety in Port
9.1.1 案例研究：良好的航海技术与交通管理
在人生的历程中，有时会发生突如其来的问题，进而引发无法避免的事故。当我们回顾时，会发现某些行动原本能有所帮助，但在当下我们却没能想到。研读此案例的最佳方式，是请教读者您：如果您身处当时的情境，您会怎么做？
这起碰撞事故为全球航运界带来了巨大的难题。人们对於事故原因存在两种截然不同的观点，这可能会引发更多混淆，并增加未来的航行风险。英国海事事故调查局（MAIB）报告（i）深入检视了船舶的实际操作方式；然而，海事法院（ii）则仅著重於法律规则，藉此判定责任归属。
图 9.1 2342 时之碰撞位置
事故经过
2015 年 2 月 11 日，阿拉伯联合大公国杰贝阿里港（Jebel Ali Port）浮标航道入口附近发生了一起严重的船舶碰撞事故。英国籍货柜船「长智轮」（Ever Smart）正以 12 节（船舶速度单位）的速度驶离港口，且已让引水人（协助指引船舶的在地专家）离船。该船撞上了马绍尔群岛籍的油轮「亚历山大 1 号」（Alexandra 1）。当时该油轮正以极慢的速度准备进港，等待刚从货柜船离船的引水人。两艘船的船艉/船艏（前段）均遭受严重损伤，但幸运的是，无人受伤，亦未造成水域污染。
如图 9.1 所示，此事故发生於杰贝阿里港管辖的区域内。通常情况下，港口的引水规章及其船舶交通管理系统（VTS）有助於协调船舶动态并防止问题发生。然而，这次这些安全措施却未能发挥作用。
9.1.2 仅在接获港口管制台警示前数秒才察觉危险
「亚历山大 1 号」的船长听到了一段原本发给他船的甚高频（VHF）无线电讯息。他误解了该讯息，并将油轮操纵至离浮标航道入口过近的位置。这对出港的「长智轮」造成了巨大的危险：油轮正以极慢的速度阻挡航道，且没有容易避让的途径。
「长智轮」的船长完全没料到在距离航道入口仅 4 链（约 0.7 公里）处会有一艘慢速航行的船舶阻挡其出口路径。他只有 8 分钟的时间来察觉风险并采取紧急避让操纵。更雪上加霜的是，他的船只在减速让引水人离船时，已向左（港侧/左舷）大幅漂移。为了回到安全水域，他增加了航速并向右（舷侧/右舷）转向 5 度，以抵销风流影响（称为风压差/流压差 Leeway）。
这起碰撞是由多个问题相互作用所导致。重要的是，两艘船并未就如何安全会船达成一致或进行沟通。两位船长均基於错误的猜测采取行动。「亚历山大 1 号」过於接近航道入口，且其船长使用了来自无线电的错误资讯。此外，「长智轮」驾驶台团队并未做好目视了望，也未利用雷达追踪油轮。「长智轮」仅在撞击前数秒——接获港口管制台的警告后——才注意到正前方的「亚历山大 1 号」。在安全航行中，您必须时刻留意来自所有船舶的碰撞风险，并在进入危险区域前即发现潜在危机。
9.1.3 因过早抵达航道入口附近而感到焦虑
事故时间轴
於 2312 时（碰撞前 30 分钟），「亚历山大 1 号」船长在雷达上看到「长智轮」通过 8 号浮标。他使用自动雷达测绘板（ARPA）来监视该货柜船的动态。他知道「长智轮」不会很快驶离航道，因此於 2314 时（碰撞前 28 分钟），他将主机指令由「微进（dead slow ahead）」调整为「停车（stop）」。油轮此时正往东向漂移，距离 1 号浮标约 1.3 海里（约 2.4 公里）。这个位置让船长感到焦虑，因为他比预期更早抵达了航道入口附近。
预估「长智轮」抵达时间以规划动态
於 2256 时，在与船舶交通服务员（VTSO – 协助管理船舶交通的人员）进行 VHF 无线电通话时，「亚历山大 1 号」船长得知「长智轮」位於 12 号浮标。他使用以下方法计算了该货柜船预计抵达引水站的时间（ETA）：
从 12 号浮标至 1 号浮标的距离：
测得为 9.25 海里（nm – 海上距离单位，约 15.3 公里）。这是透过将每个浮标间 0.75 海里的间距（於 ECDIS 或纸本海图上确认）乘以 11（12 号与 1 号浮标之间的间距数量）计算得出。
前往 1 号浮标的航行时间：
以「长智轮」12 节的航速（杰贝阿里港规定的限速）计算，公式为：(0.75×11×60)/12=41 分钟。
计算得出之抵达时间：
将 41 分钟加上 2256 时，「长智轮」预计将於 2337 时抵达 1 号浮标——比原计划的引水人登舰时间 2315 时晚了 22 分钟。
这 22 分钟的延误意味著「亚历山大 1 号」船长本可以在 2256 时就减慢速度——而不是等到接近引水站时才减速。这原本可以防止他过早且过於接近航道入口。
良好航海技术的启示：在安全区域内预先规划船舶位置，展现了船长良好的前瞻思维。对局势做出准确的预测有助於在问题发生前就解决问题。这是卓越航海技术（安全且熟练的操船能力）的核心。
9.2 消除 BHRM 中的不确定性：减速或停车
9.2.1 当我们的心智在等待隐性线索时？？
於 2319 时，「亚历山大 1 号」船长利用 VHF 无线电呼叫杰贝阿里港口管制台，以确认引水软梯（供引水人登船的梯子）的配置规定。此时，该油轮距离 1 号浮标 1.058 海里（约 1.96 公里），对地航向为 126 度，对地航速为 2.2 节（慢速）。
「亚历山大 1 号」的环境意识状态：
船长已经停车，但船舶仍有 2.2 节的对地航速。
在还需要等待 12 分钟的情况下（直到预计「长智轮」於 2337抵达 1 号浮标），以 2.2 节的速度航行，距离 1 号浮标的距离将从 1.058 海里下降到 0.618 海里（约 1.1 公里，或 6 链）。这样短的距离无法为出港船提供足够的空间来进行大幅度的转湾。
於 2328 时，「亚历山大 1 号」的主机指令被设定为「微进」。一分钟后，於 2329 时，拖船「Zakheer Bravo」利用 VHF 无线电呼叫杰贝阿里港口管制台。该拖船请求允许穿过引水人登舰区域。该拖船及其拖带的船只位於 1 号浮标以西 1.3 海里（约 2.4 公里）处（参见图 9.2）。他们正向东驶往朱美拉（Jumeirah），途经杰贝阿里。VTSO 询问拖船船长：「你看得见正在等待的那艘大油轮吗？」拖船船长表示看得见，VTSO 便指示他「从该油轮后方 1 海里（约 1.85 公里）处穿越」。
「亚历山大 1 号」船长听到了这段无线电对话的一部分，并以为港口管制台是在对「长智轮」说话。他推测为了从其船只后方通过，「长智轮」会在离开航道后向左（左舷）转向。该船长并未向任何人核实以确认是哪艘船正在接收 VTSO 的指令。
「亚历山大 1 号」的环境意识分析：
基於片段资讯做出错误猜测： 船长的第一个错误是认为港口管制台正在与「长智轮」通话。他仅基於听到的部分 VHF 无线电讯息做出此判断。如此依赖来自他人的资讯导致了重大错误。
未核实由谁应答： 第二个错误是没有核实是哪艘船在回覆 VTSO。他只注意到符合自己预想的细节，而忽略了其他无线电通话。这不一定总是源於疏忽，而是源於未时刻收听 VHF 无线电频道的坏习惯（不佳的无线电听守）。
未与他人确认： 第三个错误是没有向对方船舶或自己的值班航行员（OOW – 在驾驶台上协助的人员）进行确认。原因可能包括语言障碍（英语能力较弱）、听力问题、缺乏自信、团队合作欠佳、驾驶台人力资源管理（BHRM – 驾驶台团队如何协同工作）系统薄弱，或者公司未制定要求 OOW 协助无线电听守的规定。
对「长智轮」动态的错误猜测： 船长假设「长智轮」在驶离航道后会向左转以从其船后通过。他在未经核实的情况下做出了这个猜测，且这违背了正常的避碰规则。
违反优先通行权规则： 根据《杰贝阿里港交通管制手册》，当出港船与进港船在同一地点交会时，出港船拥有优先通行权。透过做相反的猜测，「亚历山大 1 号」船长犯下了第四个重大错误，进而导致了事故的发生。
人为不确定性与偏见的作用： 不确定性往往会将人为失误带入海难事故中。当我们清晰的思考（意识层面）在等待隐含的想法（潜意识层面）时——就像在等待提示来解开数学难题一样——混淆就会发生。在此案例中：
清晰思考： 船长清楚地听到了拖船与 VTSO 之间的通话。
潜意识影响： 在内心深处，船长希望「长智轮」能够让路。这是因为他的船只过於接近引水站，导致难以平顺地转向进入航道。这种隐性愿望的主要原因，在於失去了对抵达时间的控制，或是未对引水站附近的他船进行预先规划（缺乏防御性航行 – 未留意前方危险）。
消除不确定性： 为了摆脱失去控制和仓促做出错误决策的压力，船长切不应过早抵达引水站。这是从事故研究中获得的关键教训。这有助於减少不确定性、压力、错误猜测以及恐惧。
在良好航海技术中，有两条主要规则：第一，在船舶预计前往的方向上减速，除非您 100% 确定没有风险。第二，如果您对接下来会发生的事情不确定，请在原地停车。
如图 9.2 所示，於 2329 时，拖船「Zakheer Bravo」与「亚历山大 1 号」处於危险位置：
隐性的应对方式： 在内心深处，「亚历山大 1 号」船长透过猜测出港船会让路来解决他的操纵难题。这个猜测让他感到较为安心，并得以维持在原位。
忽略核实： 这个猜测使他跳过了向 VTSO 询问哪艘船收到何种指令的步骤。他可能担心提出询问会导致收到难以执行的指令。
高风险选择： 他选择等待的决定就短期操纵而言似乎较为轻松，但却大大增加了碰撞的风险。当时，他似乎并未过多考虑碰撞危险。然而，在刚好位於出港航道外侧的位置，船长应始终对碰撞风险保持高度警惕。
图 9.2 2329 时之拖船 ”Zakheer Bravo“ 与亚历山大 1 号
9.2.2 将您的船舶控制在安全的航向、航速与位置
如图 9.6 所示，对於需要引水人的进港船而言，正确的等待位置是在引水站标志右侧（右舷正横方向）4 链（约 0.7 公里）处。这个位置正是「亚历山大 1 号」於 2315 时所处的位置——即该船原计划让引水人登船的时间。
引水人登船的两难困境
2315 时的位置是接载引水人的绝佳区域。这与 VTSO 告知「亚历山大 1 号」船长的登船时间相符。
船长过於专注於 2200 时接获的指令。在该指令中，VTSO 要求於 2315 时抵达 1 号浮标（引水站）。「亚历山大 1 号」准时抵达，但引水船却不在那里。
引水人未能在 2315 时赶到，为船长带来了巨大的心理压力。他必须在额外的 30 分钟内保持对船舶位置与船首向（heading）的控制。
对於船长来说，更明智的选择是与 1 号浮标保持安全距离。这将使得稍后接载引水人变得更加容易。
如果「亚历山大 1 号」船长一直保持在 2315 时的位置直到 2342 时：
他将不需要猜测出港船通过 1 号浮标后的动态。
出港船将有更多空间驶离且不受阻挡。
两艘船都能更容易地遵守 COLREGs（国际海上避碰规则 – 避免船舶碰撞的全球性规则）。
不良的等待位置会带来额外的压力。
然而，VTSO 告知「亚历山大 1 号」船长在 1 号浮标接载引水人。船长原本应该做的是与 1 号浮标保持安全距离，直到引水船出来。2333 时的位置——位於引水站标志东南方 0.5 海里（约 0.9 公里）处——是等待引水人的最后良好位置。
对於操船关键要素（如航向、航速或位置）的任何疑虑，都会为船长带来隐性的压力（潜意识压力）。
船长应经常检查这些要素以减轻自己的压力。
他应将目视了望的工作交给值班航行员（OOW），并由自己不时进行抽查。
9.2.3 坚定主张（Assertive）是我们的责任担当
船长不应害羞而不去询问 VTSO，而是可以运用其权限来修正基於听闻他人讯息而产生的错误观念。
透过询问：「杰贝阿里港口管制台，这是亚历山大 1 号呼叫。请确认您的指令：长智轮是否从亚历山大 1 号艉部 1 海里处穿越？请回覆。」
船长的权威源於其对现场局势的专业了解以及自己船舶的特殊需求。岸上的 VTSO 可能无法完全掌握这些情况。
「港务长（Harbour Master）」是一个专业头衔，与「船长（Marine Master）」的职责并不相同。
我们应该将自身的安全放在首位，不要被港口当局不明确的指令所混淆。船舶交通服务（VTS）是航海人员的辅助工具。如果有任何疑虑，船长应立即向相关人员要求澄清。
9.2.4 通讯链中缺失的环节
表 9.1 2331 时引水人与长智轮船长之间的对话
(图片由杰贝阿里港提供)
9.1 BHRM in collision avoidance
9.1.1 Case study Seamanship and Traffic Management
In the story of life, there are times when a surprise problem happens, leading to an accident that cannot be stopped. When we look back, we see that some actions could have helped, but we did not think of them in the moment. The best way to study this case is to ask you, the reader: What would you do if you were in that situation?
This collision has created a big problem for the world of shipping. People have two very different views on what caused it. This can cause more confusion and increase risks in the future. The MAIB report (i) looked closely at how the ships were operated. But the Admiralty Court (ii) only focused on legal rules to decide who was at fault.
Figure 9.1 Collision position at 2342 hours
The Incident Account
On 11 February 2015, a serious ship collision happened near the entrance to the buoyed channel at Jebel Ali Port in the United Arab Emirates. The UK-registered container ship, Ever Smart, was leaving the port at 12 knots (a speed unit for ships) and had already sent away its pilot (a local expert who helps guide the ship). It hit the Marshall Islands-registered oil tanker, Alexandra 1. The tanker was entering the port very slowly, waiting for the pilot who had just left the container ship. Both ships had bad damage to their front parts (bows), but luckily, no one was hurt, and there was no pollution in the water.
As shown in Figure 9.1, this accident happened inside the area controlled by Jebel Ali Port. Normally, the port's rules for pilots and its system to manage ship traffic help organize movements and stop problems. But this time, these safety steps did not work.
9.1.2 Aware Only Seconds Before the Collision When Alerted by Port Control
The captain of Alexandra 1 heard a VHF radio message (a type of ship radio) that was meant for another ship. He misunderstood it and moved his tanker too close to the entrance of the buoyed channel. This created a big danger for the outgoing Ever Smart: the tanker was moving very slowly and blocking the way, with no easy path to avoid it.
The captain of Ever Smart did not expect a slow-moving ship to block his exit path, just 4 cables (about 0.7 kilometers) from the channel entrance. He had only 8 minutes to see the risk and make emergency moves to avoid it. To make it harder, his ship had drifted a lot to the left (port side) while slowing down to drop off the pilot. He also needed to get back to safe water, so he increased speed and changed course 5 degrees to the right (starboard) to fight against wind and current effects (called leeway).
The collision happened because of many problems working together. Importantly, the two ships did not agree or talk about how to pass each other safely. Both captains acted based on wrong guesses. Alexandra 1 got too close to the channel entrance, and its captain used bad information from the radio. Also, the team on Ever Smart's bridge did not watch well with their eyes or use radar to track the tanker. Ever Smart only saw that Alexandra 1 was right in front seconds before the crash—after a warning from port control. In safe navigation, you must watch for collision risks from all ships and spot danger areas before you enter them.
9.1.3 Upset About Arriving Too Early Near the Channel Entrance
The Incident Timeline
At 2312 (30 minutes before the collision), the captain of Alexandra 1 saw Ever Smart passing Buoy No. 8 on his radar. He used the Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) to watch the container ship's movement. He knew Ever Smart would not leave the channel quickly, so at 2314 (28 minutes before the collision), he changed the engine order from "dead slow ahead" (very slow forward) to "stop." The tanker was now drifting on an easterly direction (toward the east), about 1.3 nautical miles (about 2.4 kilometers) from Buoy No. 1. This position upset the captain, because he had arrived near the channel entrance earlier than needed.
Estimating Ever Smart’s Arrival Time to Plan Moves
At 2256 hours, during a VHF radio talk with the Vessel Traffic Service Operator (VTSO – a person who helps manage ship traffic), the captain of Alexandra 1 learned that Ever Smart was at Buoy No. 12. He calculated the container ship's estimated time of arrival (ETA) at the pilot station using this method:
- Distance from Buoy No. 12 to No. 1:
Measured as 9.25 nautical miles (nm – a unit for sea distance, about 15.3 kilometers). This came from multiplying the 0.75-nm gap between each buoy (checked on ECDIS – or on a paper chart) by 11 (the number of gaps between Buoy 12 and 1) - Travel Time to Buoy No. 1:
At Ever Smart’s speed of 12 knots (Jebel Ali’s required speed limit), the formula was: (0.75 × 11 × 60) / 12 minutes = 41 minutes. - Calculated Arrival Time:
Adding 41 minutes to 2256 hours, Ever Smart was expected to reach Buoy No. 1 at 2337 hours – 22 minutes later than the planned pilot-boarding time of 2315 hours.
This 22-minute delay meant the captain of Alexandra 1 could have slowed down at 2256 hours – instead of waiting until close to the pilot station. This would have stopped him from getting too close to the channel entrance too soon.
Seamanship Insight: Planning where to place your ship in safe areas shows a captain's good thinking ahead. Making accurate predictions about the situation helps solve problems before they start. This is the heart of strong seamanship (safe and skilled ship handling).
9.2 Avoid Uncertainty in BHRM: Slow down or stop
9.2.1 When Our Mind Waits for Hidden Clues ?？
At 2319, the captain of Alexandra 1 called Jebel Ali port control on VHF radio (a type of ship radio) to check the rules for the pilot ladder (a ladder used to board the pilot). By this time, the tanker was 1.058 nautical miles (about 1.96 kilometers) from Buoy No. 1. It was moving on a course over the ground of 126 degrees at 2.2 knots (a slow speed).
Situational awareness of “Alexandra 1” is:
- The captain had stopped the engine, but the ship still had a speed over the ground of 2.2 knots.
- With another 12 minutes of waiting (until Ever Smart was expected at Buoy No. 1 at 2337), at 2.2 knots, the distance to Buoy No. 1 would drop from 1.058 nm to 0.618 nm (about 1.1 kilometers, or 6 cables – a sea distance unit). This short distance would not give enough room for a sharp turn by an outgoing ship.
At 2328, Alexandra 1's engine order was set to "dead slow ahead" (very slow forward). One minute later, at 2329, the tugboat Zakheer Bravo called Jebel Ali port control on VHF radio. The tug asked for permission to cross the pilot boarding area. The tug and its towed boat were 1.3 nm (about 2.4 kilometers) west of Buoy No. 1 (see Figure 9.2). They were heading east to Jumeirah, past Jebel Ali. The VTSO (Vessel Traffic Service Operator – a person who helps manage ship traffic) asked the tug's captain, "Can you see the big tanker waiting?" The tug's captain said yes, and the VTSO told him to "cross 1 nm (about 1.85 kilometers) behind the tanker."
The captain of Alexandra 1 heard part of this radio talk and thought port control was speaking to Ever Smart. He guessed that to pass behind his ship, Ever Smart would turn left (to port) after leaving the channel. The captain did not check with anyone to confirm which ship was getting the instructions from the VTSO.
Situational awareness of “Alexandra” 1:
- Wrong Guess from Partial Information: The captain's first mistake was thinking port control was talking to Ever Smart. He based this on only part of the VHF radio message he heard. Relying on information from others like this led to a big error.
- Did Not Check Who Was Answering: The second mistake was not verifying which ship was replying to the VTSO. He only paid attention to details that matched his own ideas and ignored other radio talks. This was not always from carelessness, but from a bad habit of not always listening to the VHF radio channel (poor radio watch).
- No Confirmation with Others: The third mistake was not asking the other ship or his own Officer of the Watch (OOW – the person helping on the bridge) to confirm. Reasons for this could include language problems (weak English skills), hearing issues, low confidence, poor teamwork, a weak Bridge Human Resource Management (BHRM – how the bridge team works together) system, or no company rules requiring the OOW to help with radio listening.
- Bad Guess About Ever Smart's Move: The captain assumed Ever Smart would turn left after leaving the channel to pass behind his ship. He made this guess without checking, and it went against normal sea rules.
- Breaking Right-of-Way Rules: According to the Jebel Ali Harbour Traffic Control Manual, when an outgoing ship leaves the channel at the same spot where an incoming ship enters, the outgoing ship has the right to go first. By guessing the opposite, the captain of Alexandra 1 made a fourth big mistake, which helped cause the accident.
- The Role of Human Uncertainty and Bias: Uncertainty often adds human mistakes to sea accidents. Confusion happens when our clear thinking (conscious mind) waits for hidden ideas (subconscious mind), like waiting for hints to solve a math puzzle. In this case:
① Clear Thinking: The captain clearly heard the talk between the tugboat and the VTSO.
② Hidden Influence: Deep down, the captain wanted Ever Smart to give way. This came from his ship being too close to the pilot station, making it hard to turn smoothly into the channel. The main reason for this hidden wish was losing control of his arrival time or not planning for other ships near the pilot station (no defensive navigation – not watching for dangers ahead).
③ Avoiding Uncertainty: To escape the stress of losing control and making quick wrong decisions, captains should not arrive at the pilot station too early. This is a key lesson from studying accidents. It helps reduce uncertainty, pressure, wrong guesses, and fear.
In seamanship (safe and skilled ship handling), there are two main rules. First, slow down where your ship should go, unless you are 100% sure there is no risk. Second, stop where you are if you are not sure what will happen next.
As shown in Figure 9.2, at 2329, the tugboat Zakheer Bravo and Alexandra 1 were in a dangerous spot:
- Hidden Way to Cope: Deep down, the captain of Alexandra 1 solved his moving problem by guessing the outgoing ship would give way. This guess made him feel better and let him stay in place.
- Ignored Checking: This guess made him skip asking the VTSO which ship was being told what to do. He might have been afraid that asking would lead to hard instructions to follow.
- Risky Choice: His decision to wait seemed easier for short-term moving, but it greatly raised the chance of a collision. At that time, he did not seem to think much about collision danger. But in a spot just outside the outgoing channel, a captain should always stay very alert to collision risks.
Figure 9.2 Tug boat ” Zakheer Bravo “ and Alexandra 1 at 2329
9.2.2 Handle Your Ship in a Safe Direction, Speed, and Position
As shown in Figure 9.6, the correct waiting spot for an incoming ship that needs a pilot is 4 cables (about 0.7 kilometers – a sea distance unit) to the right side (starboard beam) of the pilot station markers. This spot is exactly where Alexandra 1 was at 2315 hours – the ship's planned time for the pilot to board.
The Pilot Boarding Dilemma
The position at 2315 hours is a perfect area for picking up the pilot. It matches the boarding time that the VTSO told Alexandra 1's captain.
The captain focused too much on the instructions from 2200 hours. In those, the VTSO said to reach Buoy No. 1 (the pilot station) at 2315 hours. Alexandra 1 arrived on time, but the pilot boat was not there.
The pilot not coming at 2315 hours added a lot of mental stress to the captain. He had to keep the ship's position and direction (heading) under control for an extra 30 minutes.
A smarter choice for the captain would have been to stay a safe distance away from Buoy No. 1. This would make it easier to board the pilot later.
If the captain of Alexandra 1 had stayed in the 2315 hours position until 2342 hours:
- He would not need to guess what the outgoing ship would do after passing Buoy No. 1.
- The outgoing ship would have more space to leave without any block.
- Both ships could follow COLREGs (International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea – global rules to avoid ship crashes) more easily.
A bad waiting spot creates extra stress.
However, the VTSO told the captain of Alexandra 1 to board the pilot at Buoy No. 1. What the captain should have done was keep a safe distance from Buoy No. 1 until the pilot boat came out. The position at 2333 hours – 0.5 nautical miles (about 0.9 kilometers) southeast of the pilot station marker – was the last good spot to wait for the pilot.
- Any doubt about key parts of ship handling, like direction (heading), speed, or position, will create hidden stress (subconscious pressure) for the captain.
- The captain should check these parts often to reduce his own stress.
- He should give the job of watching with eyes (visual lookout) to the Officer of the Watch (OOW) and check it himself from time to time.
9.2.3 Assertive is our accountability
Instead of feeling shy to ask the VTSO, the captain can use his authority to fix a wrong idea based on information heard from others.
- By asking, “Jebel Ali port control, this is Alexandra 1 calling. Please confirm your order: Is it correct that Ever Smart is to cross 1 nm astern of Alexandra 1? Over.”
- The captain’s authority comes from his expert knowledge of the situation and the special needs of his own ship. These may not be fully known to the VTSO on shore.
- “Harbour master” is a professional title, not the same as the job of a marine master.
We should put our own safety first and not get confused by unclear orders from port authorities. The VTS (Vessel Traffic Service) is a help for sailors. If there is any confusion, the captain should ask for quick clarifications from the right people.
9.2.4 Missing Part in Communication Chain
Table 9.1 Conversation Between the Pilot and Ever Smart’s Captain at 2331
(Image courtesy of Jebel Ali Port)
At 2331 hours (see Figure 9.3), as Ever Smart was nearing Buoy No. 3, the pilot and the captain talked about the pilot leaving the ship (Table 9.1). The pilot gave clear instructions to Ever Smart’s captain about what to do after he left. The pilot and the captain seemed to understand the situation the same way. However, Alexandra 1’s captain was not told where to wait or what Ever Smart planned to do after leaving the channel.
- “So captain, the time has come for me to go. Just follow the channel”: According to the Jebel Ali port rules, as an outgoing ship, Ever Smart had the “right of way” over the incoming Alexandra 1. This matched common sense and safe ship handling practices.
- “the time has come for me to go”: The pilot may have been watching the incoming ship’s movement for a while. Only when Ever Smart reached Buoy No. 3 did the pilot think it was close enough to leave and go to the incoming ship. It is not clear if the pilot told the captain that he was about to board the incoming ship. Did the captain notice a ship was near the pilot station?
- “Just follow the channel”: The pilot told the captain to stay in the channel but did not say where to exit it. Usually, the channel entrance is more dangerous than the channel itself, but the pilot did not seem to think about this.
- The pilot did not warn the captain about the incoming ship because he thought the outgoing ship had the “right of way”.
- Master: “Do you think I can go myself?” The captain was worried if letting the pilot leave at Buoy No. 3 followed port rules.
- The pilot’s choice to leave the outgoing ship was based on his view of the incoming ship’s distance.
Figure 9.3 Radar Picture of Ever Smart when pilot and master discussed pilot’s disembarkation
The incoming ship was 0.5 nm south of the pilot boarding mark on the chart, or 0.75 nm from Buoy No. 1. The outgoing ship was nearing Buoy No. 3. The distance between the two ships was about 2.5 nm (the gap between two buoys in a row was 0.75 nm)..
- If the captain had known the pilot's plan, he would have seen the incoming ship at 2 nm away. He could then have watched it using eyes or radar.
Pilot: “Yes, yes. There is this coming now. There is just the one ship. Only this tanker.” The pilot did not know the incoming ship's name. He just said “One tanker coming now” in three short parts without using the name “Alexandra 1”. This was a bad habit for the pilot and the outgoing ship's captain. It left them without a clear idea of which ship he would board. In an emergency, the pilot could not call the ship well on VHF radio.
- With Ever Smart moving at 12.9 knots over the ground, covering 2.5 nm would take 11.6 minutes. Pilot boats usually go slower than 12 knots. There would not be enough time for a pilot to climb up and down ladders on two big ships and reach their bridges as the ships got close. This meant the two ships would meet in the channel without a pilot on either one. This was not good for port operations.
- If the incoming ship had come too close to Buoy No. 1, the VTSO should have warned it to stay clear.
- As the captain of an incoming ship, you must know that your ship's position can affect outgoing ships.
Master: Yes. Yes. Mr. Mr. pilot had said one vessel although it is not very clear..
- The captain of Ever Smart did not ask about the incoming ship's name, course, speed, or position.
- How could the captain be happy with the pilot’s unclear words? The answer is in the radar screen in Figure 9.3. When the pilot talked about an incoming ship, everyone's eyes went to the long-trail target on the right front (starboard bow), not Alexandra 1 on the left front (port bow), which was marked on the screen. The captain of Ever Smart must have thought the fast-moving incoming ship (the long-trail target) was the one the pilot meant. That is why he asked no more questions.
Pilot: It’s coming. It will wait.... Anyway I go there before ....okay, captain.
- It’s coming.
- The captain of Ever Smart did not ask about the incoming ship's name, course, speed, or position.
- How could the captain be happy with the pilot’s unclear words? The answer is in the radar screen in Figure 9.3. When the pilot talked about an incoming ship, everyone's eyes went to the long-trail target on the right front (starboard bow), not Alexandra 1 on the left front (port bow), which was marked on the screen. The captain of Ever Smart must have thought the fast-moving incoming ship (the long-trail target) was the one the pilot meant. That is why he asked no more questions.
- It will wait....
- The pilot was guessing about the incoming ship’s plans, but he had no real knowledge if it would wait or move.
- He was basically calming himself but did not tell the incoming ship to stop.
- Anyway I go there before ....
- The pilot thought he could control things by going to the incoming ship sooner.
- okay captain.
- If “OK Captain” had been a question, not an order to accept the situation, the captain could have shared his view and asked the pilot to keep guiding the ship out safely.
- But the captain may have given up being firm because he thought the ship on the right side was the one the pilot meant.
The pilot gave Ever Smart’s captain clear instructions on what to do after he left, as below.
- “Just follow the channel.”
- But words like “There is this coming now. There is just the one ship. Only this tanker.” and “It will wait.... Anyway I go there before” left out key details.
- The pilot did not know the incoming ship’s name, and Ever Smart did not know its distance, direction, course, or speed.
- Based only on his guess, Ever Smart's captain thought he understood the situation
- There is this coming now. There is just the one ship. Only this tanker.
- It will wait.... Anyway I go there before.
- Pilot did not know the incoming ship's name. The incoming ship's distance, direction, course, or speed were not known by Ever Smart. Yet, Ever Smart's captain thought he understood the situation.
- From these talks between the pilot and the captain, it was clear they did not agree.
- The pilot had Alexandra 1 in mind, while Ever Smart's captain may have been looking at another ship on the right side, not the one right ahead.
- Asking the pilot to point out the incoming ship on the radar screen would have fixed this easily.
- As shown in Figure 9.3, there were no ARPA-tracked targets. When the pilot talked about an incoming ship, he could not point it out to the captain by target number.
- Also, Alexandra 1’s radar echo looked like an anchored ship, and it did not send AIS data as required by SOLAS.
The communication process goes from the sender’s mind to the sender’s mouth, then to the receiver’s ear, and finally to the receiver’s mind. Usually, the weakest part is from the sender’s mouth to the receiver’s ear. This part needs extra checks or references to avoid mistakes about what is being talked about. Asking “Show me which ship is the incoming one on the radar screen” is an important extra check to stop such errors.
