Chapter 4 What we aware – the world we sense.doc
Chapter 4
What we shall aware – The world we sense- Risk Compensation
Most effective way of communication is asking. Most precious resource is culture.
What we shall aware?
The world is risky which full of uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity. However like the sun shine on everyone on Earth, the world expose the same risk to us in a generic term but percept differently from each one’s own structure which consist of his knowledge, skill, culture, emotion, intuition. Risk refers to the chance that our awareness turns out to be inadequate to deal with the world safely and effectively. The perception of risk to us is relative depend on our awareness to it. The awareness is perception of a situation or fact. Our conscious awareness is our attention which generated from same structure of knowledge, skill, culture, emotion, intuition.
l Knowledge is something we know about the environment which stored in our ST memory.
l Skill is something in our LT memory which we can do or recognize it without think over twice.
l Culture is our group LT memory usually refers to the interaction of people.
l Emotional feeling is the green or red light for action in normal situation.
l Intuition is response from our subconscious/unconscious in emergency situation.
l Attention is our conscious awareness of the situation.
l Risk is our situation awareness differs from our conscious awareness.
Our conscious awareness (attention) is limited by magical 7 only which are far more than enough. The situation or the World could change at any time, one minute before everything is alright but after one minute situation is changed and out of control. Our attention need to change according to the situation varied.
For example: One inbound vessel grounded for one green buoy disposition 5 cable away.
- 1. At 17.23.33 UTC, vessel applied “starboard 15” rudder angle to initial the turning while the initial attention is on the “ south cardinal buoy” for course keeping. The distance to turning point is about one ship’s length 330 meters, at this time the “south cardinal buoy” is about to lost sight due to the blind area at bow area.
- 2. At 17.25.25 UTC, vessel applied “Hard Starboard” rudder angle to accelerate the turning for the bow still steady on her original course(ship’s heading almost unchanged 343 degrees). The “south cardinal buoy” is out of sight into bow blind area (distance less than 500 meters ahead). Probably at the same time, the navigator’s attention shifted from “south cardinal buoy” to “green buoy” at starboard beam. But the “green buoy” is no where to be seen? What happened? What should I do? What should I check? What should I ask for help? Two minutes before (At 17.23.33 UTC ) everything is fine and now (At 17.25.25 UTC ) why I become such panic? Is there anything I had missed?
- 3. At 17.26.29 UTC, the panic of no sight of “green buoy” has been released as “green buoy” appear in starboard bow. Ship’s heading had changed from 342 to 351 degree now. The turning initialed so sure at the sight of “south cardinal buoy” seems activated too early now. Vessel is about to enter the shallow water of starboard side fairway. The navigator use “Hard Port” rudder angel to check the swing. This is a fatal mistake cause the incident within one minute (17.25.25-17.26.29 UTC).
- 4. At 17.27.11 UTC, ships had steady the heading at 354 degrees, the swing had stopped. At this point, the grounding is inevitable due to ship’s turning characteristics of any vessel will need 1 to 1.5 ship’s length to activate the turn. The port side rudder had eased to “Port 20”.
- 5. At 17.29.02 UTC, two minutes passed and vessel had advanced 400 meters. Navigator had aware the mistake by comparing other buoys position or checked at ECDIS ship’s position. Rudder order of “Hard Starboard” had applied again but everything is too late for now.
Never rely on the buoy’s position (especially one buoy only) to fix your ship’s position. This is the first lesson every navigator learnt from terrestrial navigation. Why one “green buoy” out of four in the area drifted, the attention of navigator immediately took away by this incident? Is there anything is missing here? A convenience explanation is Incompetency which might cause by limited mental capacity of magical 7 as we discussed earlier. Four buoys at the same time is a big burden to anyone while navigator attention are on the heading, rudder, telegraph speed, turning rate and wheel over point….etc, at the same time. However, if we can categorize all these buoys in this turning point into a group like the diamond shapes below it will help us a lot to double check for any one is missing. Any time when we approach this turning point, we should look for the diamond shape is intact or not? Not the “south cardinal buoy”, “green buoy”, “red buoy”, and shooting up each one by one. If the diamond is missing something must be gone wrong. In shipping, we always have time to double check the cause. The ability to assembly all relevant information into one items and ease the burdens of naïve is called “chunking” (an important concept in recognize psychology).
I like to point out this: situation of something missing in the sea can be easily solved by one glance at ECDIS position if navigator confidents about the position at ECDIS by previous check while him took the command of the ship. Over-rely on ECDIS will result in another human element called complacency. Not using all available means in navigational bridge to help his watch is incompetent. To avoid this uncertainty of ship’s position and OOW complacency over-reliance of ECDIS, both diamond shape buoys and ECDIS should be used during the watch.
In checking the turning rate, beside the rate of turn (ROT) indicator on steering stand and head up display. The Doppler log reading of bow and stern speed could be a very useful indicator of the turning process as well. We can make sure of the turning in progress by the side speed shown on Doppler Log panel. One thing is for sure if Doppler Log is functional, no side speed at bow or stern no turning rate will be detected, no turning is activated.
In this case, our attention should shift as following:
Before the turning maneuvering begin, OOW should direct his attention to remember
l next course reading to steer? Rank D
l time to arrive next turning point? Rank C
l time need for turning, what the rate of turn are appropriate? Rank B
l time and position to put wheel over? Rank A
1. At 17.23.33 UTC, vessel applied “starboard 15” rudder angle to initial the turning while the initial attention is on the “ South Cardinal Buoy” for course keeping. The distance to turning point is about one ship’s length 330 meters, at this time the “South Cardinal Buoy” is about to lost sight due to the blind area at bow area. A prudent navigator will check on the buoys diamond shape before turning rudder order is given as long as our eye can see the South Cardinal Buoy (one for all and all for one). If the eye contact is not easy due to visibility or glimmer on the water surface, RADAR echo could easily detect the diamond shape.
2. At 17.25.25 UTC, vessel applied “Hard Starboard” rudder angle to accelerate the turning for the bow still steady on her original course(ship’s heading almost unchanged 343 degrees). The “South Cardinal Buoy” is out of sight into bow blind area (distance less than 500 meters ahead). Probably at the same time, the navigator’s attention shifted from “south cardinal buoy” to “green buoy” at starboard beam. But the “Green Buoy” is no where to be seen? What happened? What should I do? What should I check? When “Green Buoy” is missing to check other buoys around by eye sight may be difficult due to the geographic position of these four buoys are around four cardinal directions of our own ship. This situation could be easily solved by check ECDIS position, this where our attention need to focus on.
3. At 17.26.29 UTC, the panic of no sight of “green buoy” has been relieved as “green buoy” appear in starboard bow. Ship’s heading had changed from 342 to 351 degree now. The turning initialed so sure at the sight of “south cardinal buoy” seems activated too early now. Vessel is about to enter the shallow water of starboard side fairway. The navigator use “Hard Port” rudder angel to check the swing. The panic started for worry about turning too early, grounding risk is imminent. Recommended action is to direct our attention to verify ECDIS position correctness or not.
4. At 17.27.11 UTC, ship should alter course to 030 degree which now heading is only 354 degree. In this position vessel should had initial his turn, wheel over position should be 1 ~1.5 ship’s length before here started at 17.24.00 UTC. The turn initialed by the “South Cardinal Buoy” need to turn at turning rate of 10 degrees per minute in 3 minutes interval which vessel will advance 500 meters by 6 knots speed. The attention at this moment should focus on estimating the turning rate is enough or not by reading of ROT or Doppler Log bow/stern side speed readings.
5. At 17.29.02 UTC, ship should steady on new course now. The attention of navigator should shift from this diamond shape buoys to next navigational aid.
At any time, the use of ECDIS will help a lot to ship’s OOW if the GPS position is reliable. By comparing the ship’s shape inside the fairway can give the OOW the sense of ship’s actual position of bow and stern which once need special training to acquire this feel by experienced pilot only. Even for experienced pilot, ship’s position in ECDIS display will give them great help they did not have before. Why the navigators panic at lost sight of Green Buoy? Lack of working habit with ECDIS is one of the reasons. His working routine with buoys in turning point needs to be modified to include more hints (check on diamond shape).
The most effective way of communication is to ask.
“What we should aware?” is a dynamic process of attention shifting in different situations.
“Did OOW pay attention to those data in correct sequence?”
If master want to know his OOW had correct procedural training in Turning Maneuvering just to ask
Before the turning: (refer to the drawings above)
l ask OOW “ What is next course to steer?” in this case the answer is “Sir, 030 degree”
l ask OOW “ What time to arrive next turning point?” in this case the answer is “Sir, 17.26.29 UTC” ship position No. 3
l ask OOW “ What time need for turning, what the rate of turn are appropriate?” in this case the answer is “Sir, 20 degree per minutes” (course change from 340 to 030 in 2 and half minutes)
l ask OOW “ What time and position to put wheel over?” in this case the answer is “Sir, 17.23.33 UTC” ship position No.1
If master want to know his OOW had correct training in “Buoyed Channel Navigation” just to ask
- 1. At 17.23.33 UTC, Ask OOW “ Did you see the buoys diamond shape?”
in this case the answer is “Yes Sir, all four buoys are in position.”
- 2. At 17.25.25 UTC, Ask OOW “ Did you see the Green Buoy?”
in this case the answer is “No Sir, “Green Buoy” is missing.”
Followed by “ Did you check own ship position on ECDIS?”
in this case the answer is “Yes Sir, own ship position on ECDIS is OK.”
- 3. At 17.26.29 UTC, Ask OOW “ Did you …………………….?”
get the answer “Yes Sir, …………………...”
Captain is like a Manager should monitor OOW performance by company’s sailing safety policy/SOP and make proper procedures by his judgments in “Standing Order” and “Night Order”. Each question asked by Master to OOW is a check point in check list to monitor correct procedural memories are applied. Through long time training by questioning it will become the working habits of OOW which will help him in any emergency situation and past down to next generations at sea. This is a very vital part to any company operation safety.
The world we sense: decide what our priority is
The world we sense is a multiple process ( ST memorized, paid attention, making sense, making decision, appraised and learnt) in all our conscious levels and all combined in our working memory. While our conscious capacity is limited by magical 7 our working memories size are regulated by our emotional/procedures/context in our LT memory, i.e. our working habit. All these emotional/procedures/context combined LT memories works like various sub-routine in computer programming. Various components will compete our attention of sensory (procedural memory) and many possible routes/consequences evaluate in our mind (context memory) and many emotions stir in our heart (emotional memory). Which one is the most suitable for current situation is decided by our feeling or intuition. “I do what my guts tell me” is the motto.
Although it looks reckless to do things (by guts) like this, it is actually happened in our daily life while most of things can be perfectly anticipated its causes and effects. Only our anticipated cause and effect differ from the actual world is where the risk started. Risk is our conscious awareness aroused by our working habit cannot meet situation changed. Our conscious awareness capacity is limited by magical 7 but the situation may change in any time. OOW must decide what is his priority first then he can take proper action to cope with.
For example:
COLREG 1972 specified the sailing rules for power driven vessel and regulate other vessels conduct in and out of Traffic Separation Scheme and …..etc,.
but the actual world out there is like this drawing copied at collision case of vessel No. 5 and No. 6 at August 24 night, 1999 in English Channel (collision three miles north-west of F3 buoy )from the shore surveillance radar at Dover strait, each break mark on the track is 6 minutes run. The whole track marks about 20 minutes run of the vessels at scene where those fishing and working boats track are not included (In the true plotting dispatched). The obvious dangers are shallow water for grounding, unknown fishing vessel sailing around, vessels in all size approaching in all directions, slower vessel ahead not sure where she is going (No. 8 vessel actual crossing no. 6 course line), where the give-way vessel will start the avoidance action (No. 5 vessel delay her avoidance action to comply the COLREG for No. 3 and No. 2 as a stand-on vessel)……..
In this multiple meeting situations, the collision happened that night.
If we think about the collision with possible human life loss ( No. 5 is a cruiser vessel with bright light in nighttime) the chilly feeling creeping up from our cold feet. To where we can find possible solution to avoid these dangerous meeting situation happened in non breakable interval during the transit? How can a North Sea pilot survived at this environment day after day? When the South wind is blowing, the visibility reduced to 1.5 Nautical Mile. Visual contact of target movement had became difficult, OOW have to rely on RADAR to early detect target. But early detection of radar targets could mean nothing at next minutes as each vessel made decision in different time frame according to her maneuvering characteristics.
By the COLREG, the stand-on vessel should keep course and speed when the give-way vessel takes the avoidance action. This rule applied when only two vessels are involved in the risk of collision. If the stand-on vessel has the obligation to give way to third vessel, there is no quick solution. OOW must decide what is his priority first then he can take proper action to cope with.
Priority 1 and last: Safety First
The safest way for the give way vessel in heavy traffic to avoid all close quarter situation is taking avoidance action once for all and leaves no doubt. This practice can be seen from the Blue track of No.1 vessel North-west bound started form the 10 meters depth bank. With No.2 and No. 3 vessel are overtaking ahead and No.4 vessel crossing from starboard side, his choice is altering course to give way to all vessels ( vessel No. 2, 3 and 4 ) and proceed to a safe area behind all these traffics.
Below is a demonstration: any avoidance action should avoid the pocket trap by decisive action,
The action been taken to avoid multiple traffic is altered the course to 350(T) which is aimed at astern of vessel No.4. After No.4 vessel had more broad relative bearing of her port bow, No. 1 go back to course 330(T) then course again. The maneuvering hour for these actions is only taken 4 minutes time (see the drawing above), but it save a vessel out of a very complicated situation. One point need to emphasize here is vessel No.4 is not a target involved in collision risk in original course and speed. For the avoidance action to vessel No. 2 and No. 3, the approaching of vessel No. 4 become a concern. It is prudent to give way in the first instant to vessel No. 4 and 3 and 2 rather than wait and see what will come out next.
Another vessel should play safe is the green track vessel No.5 going south-westerly direction. With two vessel crossing from starboard side (No. 6 and No.8), she is obliged to give way. While there are three vessels (No.1, No.2 and No.3) crossing from port side which she should maintain her course and speed. However port side targets are all irrelevant, the most threatened vessel No. 3 is altered course to 340(T) to pass her astern. Other two vessels will not pass her bow when crossing, actually she is free to alter course to starboard side as her free will.
The only concern here is the vessel No. 7 which is an overtaken vessel if Vessel No. 5 to alter course to 280 to avoid No.6 and 8.
Course 280(T) is not forever. It is only used to initial the avoidance action just like the course altering of vessel No. 1 alter to course 350(T) at the first instance. And vessel No.5 already passed vessel No. 7 at 12 minutes time. The consecutive maneuverings will not jeopardize the situation if vessel No.5 tried not to cross vessel No. 7’s bow. After vessel No.6 and 8 fine on No.5 port bow, NO.5 can alter course back to original little by little. These course altering actions will help to reduce vessel speed also. It will be happier if these actions been adopted in that night. Imaging the target to avoid is a mountain to conquer and your avoidance action is climbing to the top. The top of the mountain is the target’s stern. Don’t wait for the mountain to move. Go find your own way. If several mountains line up ahead, do go around the last one. Don’t be silly to up and down one by one. If Vessel no. 5 take the action in time, the track of that night will be as below.
Risk Compensation: Complacency
Only our anticipated cause and effect differ from the actual world is where the risk started. Risk is something we knew it by heart that will happen but are under our control. Not like uncertainty that we might not have any idea it existence. If everything we do will cause definite results which are total controllable by our efforts the risk is eliminated. Will we feel happier? The answer is no. we called it boring or normalization. Anything we do we always do it with our feeling or the urge to do. If the risky feeling of something bad will happen had lost we will lost the motivation to avoid it. This is human nature to keep us moving all the time since we are a child. We need the feeling to do something interest or something new or something will change in any time. In the picture, first time parachute jumping of an 98 years old man.
Booth's rule#2: "The safer skydiving gear becomes, the more chances skydivers will take, in order to keep the fatality rate constant"
Risk we can accept is always the probability multiple by its fatality.
Risk = probability * fatality = greater probability * lesser fatality = lesser probability * greater fatality
There are many studies in road transportation in the usage of ABS (Anti-lock braking systems) in motor car and Bicycle helmets user. The study show drivers of vehicles with ABS tend to drive faster, follow closer and brake later. And adults accustomed to wearing helmets cycled more slowly without a helmet, but no difference in helmeted and unhelmeted cycling speed was found for cyclists who do not usually wear helmets.
If the risk level is reduced we will set into a mood called “Complacency”. Once US NASA defined this word as “false status of security mentally although the physical threat is still present. Mentally, the conscious is under low aroused status and feels self –sustained without any solid ground of reason, almost in an unconscious status.” The lesson learnt by NASA is Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred on January 28, 1986, when Space Shuttle Challenger (mission STS-51-L) broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, leading to the deaths of its seven crew members.
We shall look at this case below:
In a cool and clear December night, one ocean-going vessel sailed out from Japan Hakata port. Captain lookout around Fukuoka Bay, in sight, there is no fishing and other vessels around. At 0348 hours Captain decided to ring full away at the spot. In 0400 hours, chief mate took over the watch and made a fix to confirm the ship's position as good practice of seamanship. In the ARPA screen, he acquired some targets outside Fukuoka Bay. After the target is marked on ARPA, Chief focused on changing course and the heading is steady at 345 (T) with 15 knots speeds. In 0405, chief mate checked ARPA screen again and found a target outside Fukuoka Bay, heading 240 (T) with speed around 8 ~ 9 kts which had a collision risk warning. 2-3 miles after this ship, other coastal vessels sailed in approximate the same course and speed.
Chief mate made the assumption that this crossing ship will change course to port to enter Fukuoka Bay. To clarify the intention of this southwest bound vessel, chief mate tries to arouse other vessel’s attention; he flashed the vessel with hand held torch light, followed by VHF calling. While chief mate tried many times, the approaching boat did not respond any. When these two vessels getting closer and closer, out of same assumption, chief mate changed heading at 0413, turn left to heading 330 (T), so as to clear of the port entering channel. The Southwest bound vessel does not act as chief mate’s expectation change course to port, she remained in her original course and speed. When the collision risk is imminent, chief mate order the rudder to “Hard Port” to avoid the collision. No matter how hard chief mate had tried, the collision did happen at 0424. The angle of blow is 10-15 degrees. (Wrong assumption)
Outbound vessel ship collided at starboard side. Damages are not serious, some outer shell plates and inner frames had dented, but not broken. No crew members were injured and oil pollution. Subsequent marine incident reports revealed, while the collision happened with coastal vessel there is no one on duty at her bridge. So, outbound ocean going vessel chief mate could not get any response from the approaching coastal vessel. However, even someone was on the coastal vessel’s bridge watch, outbound vessel still has the obligation to give way for the crossing vessels.
(False recognition)
Collision scene and route taken
Second, the case analysis
Let's take a look at the radar echo data reconstructed by marine investigator. The collision time is 0424. If both vessel maintained original course and speed (outbound vessel keep course at 345 degrees and not change to 330 degrees at 0420 hours (C-4 as four minutes before the collision)), outbound ship will have a very good chance to sail after the target vessel without collision. This tendency can be also clarified by the relative bearing changed which were reduced by each three minutes intervals(C-16 at 29 degree, C-13 at 28.5 degree,C-10 at 27 degree and C-7 at 25 degree). However judging the collision risk by the relative bearing, the parallaxes of a vessel approximate have to take into account. The RB(Relative Bearing) reduced one degree at every three minutes intervals. When these two vessels getting closer, the visual shape other closing vessel will increase rapidly. Also the RB changes of these two vessels are not substantial enough (large enough), the risk of collision seems unavoidable. (Detailed collision avoidance maneuvering options are in the end of this chapter for deck practitioners).
In this case, the complacency comes from1 Fully equipped bridge. Complacency from the communication equipment we had. Once vessel had these equipment, duty officers lost anxiety of collision risk, and rely his hope to establish communication at the last minute in an attempt to avoid the collision which were exactly what the chief mate had done.
2 From daily routine work we completed at bridge. Most people has the feeling on the bridge, it seems to be the most unproductive time in his career from doing nothing but lookout although every one and each of his mentor and text/article had emphasized the importance of lookout. Some OOW will assign additional works for themselves to fully utilized the time. Thus, when the value of prudent navigation safety are slackened.
3 From the rush hours after. While you are working very diligently on the bridge after taking a series of avoidance action, everything seems managed very well. You are quite proud of yourself. Now ship’s Heading is set and the autopilot is engaged. Navigational equipment and main engine are working normally, vessels sailing around the coast had reduced in numbers, now seafarers feel more relaxed. Finally, all anxieties are disappeared. This is the time OOW decided to do some errands to kill the time. In this case, coastal vessel had just cleared Kanmon Straits , one of the most narrow and busy Strait in Japan. OOW had left the bridge unmanned.
4 From expectations of Reoccurrence sailing. Coastal vessel almost sailed in same route every week over a prolonged time unless change owner or other means of transportation are available. Out of these sailing experiences generated some expectations from the voyages they took. Coastal vessel might think “In generally, no vessel will sail outbound in this early morning at 0410”. For Ocean-going vessels, out of inexperience, will have other expectations, coastal vessel will use the channel to enter to Hakata Port. Outbound vessels did not know, for cargo operation in HAKATA , inbound vessel arrival time are still much too early. The target vessel is actually sailing to diffirent destination which means crossing only. If we did not know these simple facts, the situation awareness are not exercised properly. We will not even know we are at “unreasonable expectations” (Japanese terms as NASA’s complacency).
5 from the actual work, we have accumulated fatigue / mental disable / emotional disorders / stress / depression. Under such circumstances people cannot concentrate on the details of the work. Ocean-going vessel departed Hakata in early hours, before sailing, OOW have done a lot of work in preparation for departure like adjust the ballast, check the lashing and stowage, monitor the reefer and stand by at fore station for some time. After sailing at 0348 hours, chief mate immediately took the watch which had accumulated considerable degree of fatigue. Some Japanese company forbid the sailing at early morning to save the late night shift double charge of pilot and tug boat, etc,.., also serve as prudent seamanship to avoid any neglect caused by fatigue of personal, on board or longshoreman
6 From the watch with captain or pilot, into a state of complacency. If OOW trust or rely the ability of captain or pilot on the bridge, OOW will not double check or doubt the decision and judgment made by his superiors. Under the subconscious of OOW , he was now in a state which feel quite comfortable and harmless. The complacency set in without notice.(defer to authority).
7 In computer watch age, even the senior OOW or some Master depend on ARPA information only to do the evaluation of collision risk which cause a state of complacency. In the interpretation of collision risk in ARPA data has its limitations, especially when two vessels are in close range and frequent heading changes involved due to continuous avoidance actions. With available ARPA data, captain or OOW has lost their situational awareness of collision risk. Lookout as the COLREG defined “Every vessel must at all times keep a proper look-out by sight (day shape or lights by eyes or visual aids), hearing (sound signal or Marine VHF radio) and all available means (e.g. Radar, ARPA, AIS, GMDSS...) in order to judge if risk of collision exists.”. Proper lookout just like situational awareness should consist of sight, hearing and others electrical means. Reader can challenge yourself to the correctness in your visual skill to roughly determine vessel distance, relative bearing change and collision risk judgment without double check on navigational equipment. The visual skill is important because it function inside our brain which had auto connections to our long term memory and Hippocampal. In our conscious, man is no match with computer in calculation ability. But in our subconscious, computer is no match with our ability in mirror image matching and the ability in decision making (and we can do it both at blink of eye). In this case (at C-4 position, chief alter course to 330 degree), chief mate cannot tell the most valuable action to avoid the collision is by altering the course to starboard side by using the visual relative bearing change detection technique. With the ARPA limitations in mind and lack of visual skill, chief mate actual made wrong decision out of panic. This kind of complacency is so deeply rooted in this RADAR/ARPA trained generation (lost visual skill without notice), I personally knew a three year experience captain had a collision outside a busy harbor fairway due to lack of ARPA data acquired beforehand and lack of visual skill afterward.
8 From the privileges of International Convention COLREG associated so as into the state of complacency. Target vessel sailed along Japanese coastal water on her portside while OOW leaving the bridge without manning in early morning. To this absent OOW’s mind, no other vessel will depart from Hakata at this early hour. Even a ship is sailing out, the outgoing vessels should give way to own vessel (coastal vessel). This right of way is likely to get complacent spirit anchored. Outbound vessel might neglect own vessel presented in this vicinity and only sighted in last moments were not in coastal vessel OOW’s mental pictures which called recognition mistake.
9 From management so as into the complacent status. The employer does not require employees to be responsible for their actions, mismanagement (like unmanned bridge is allowed). The employees get no appraise of their achievement. Did not have a clear understanding of the dedication, punished creative thinking, and not knew rightful actions taken by their employees. The employer just ask employee to follow their commands.
How to avoid the complacency in Watch?
Let’s put in navigation terms, how to overcome complacency which can be summarized as below.
As the old saying, The most effective way of communication is to ask. Only this time we should ask ourself to overcome the complacency by:
1. Utilize any topics available in bridge or engine room, to do in-depth research and study, to eliminate monotonous work, maintaining appropriate vigilance and avoid relaxing.
2. Assuming navigational instrument fault situations and find appropriate procedures to overcome, self-training in order to improve the correctness of emergency response procedures.
3. By interaction with other members on the bridge, in order to improve our professional skill and experiences which may not possible to get from any text book.
4. Challenge the correctness of standard operating procedures, standing order or night order. Let other members on the bridge to check your priority in emergency procedures, exchange of experience and your observations.
5. Ask yourself under the circumstances of a particular kind of cross situation, how they will react and rethink what is forgotten in your program, and your expectations for this situation, how to confirm the action, the consequences that might arise, and What methods can be used to resolve the case.
6. Actual avoid fatigue / emotional weakness / disorders / stress. Summoned more help to the bridge either other OOWs or the Master, to reduce the accumulated stress levels.(Macho is also a complacency)
Carefully examine your own fatigue, aware of your own alertness and finding appropriate ways to concentrate on the watch. (by a cup of coffee maybe)
As long as we can use these methods above to avoid the complacency, we can understand the navigational watch is not an easy job to avoid any accidents/incidents if we have to fight with our boring and motivate by our self. As a captain and senior OOW, temporarily lapse of mind or inattention may happen in our daily without major consequence. Modern science had indicated that man may lost their working memory and forget what he was supposed to do in very short interval, this called lapse of mind. If the error margin is big for young OOW watch in open sea this won’t pose a problem. If the watch is executed in coastal and confined water area, we will need other licensed OOW help to avoid this “One person Error” whether it caused physically or mentally.
End of Chapter 4