By Captain John Konrad (gCaptain)
Every ship, regardless of nationality or purpose, is required to carry one terse book . This book is titled the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions but is better know by its acronym “COLREGs”. The chapters are short and to the point and ship officers are required to make marks of 90% on COLREGs tests taken to keep up their licenses. In order to pass this stringent requirement sailors have developed mnemonic aids to help them remember the contents. When the crew loses control of steering, the COLREGs demands that the ship display two red lights in a vertical line. The mnemonic for this rule is “Red over Red, the Captain’s dead”. Sailboats are required to display a red and green light and its said “Red over Green, sailing machine”. There are many more like this but one important rule for avoiding collisions with Navy warships is missing: “If it’s grey stay away.”1
While the media, with a very little hard data, attempts to understand the erratic maneuvers of the containership ACX Crystal on the night of her collision with the Destroyer USS Fitzgerald… professional mariners are certain that a long investigation will find the US Navy ship at fault.
Is this conclusion the result of professional arrogance? Or maybe because of resentment and jealousy over the fact that Navy captains are praised and decorated by the public and media while merchant ship captains live mostly unnoticed. Or is it because they are correct?
As a ship captain along with years working with the U.S. Navy both aboard ships and ashore – here are the reasons why I believe they are correct. The USS Fitzerald was at fault.
Communication Failure
Despite recent advancements in electronic collision avoidance tools like automatic identification systems (AIS), the three most important tools for avoiding a collision are a Captain’s eyes, tongue and ears.
Eyes, looking out the windows of his ship, are important because they can process information – like erratic course changes – faster and more accurately than electronic RADAR and charting systems that take time to aggregate data.
A tongue because the quickest and most effective way to predict how a ship is going to maneuver in the minutes before a collision is to call the Captain of the other ship on the VHF radio and ask.
Ears are important because language barriers and cultural differences are prominent at sea and you must listen intently to the other ship’s reply if you want any chance of understanding her intentions.
It is likely that USS Fitzgerald’s Captain used only one, or possibly none, of these tools when communicating with the ACX Crystal.
In the moments leading up to a collision a merchant ship captain has to do everything but steer the ship himself. With the assistance of one officer he has to watch the RADAR and AIS, plot the relative courses of nearby vessels, communicate with the Engine Room, talk with other ships on the VHF radio and issue orders. But on a navy ship each of these jobs is performed by a small team of sailors who report changes to, and obey orders from, the officer of the watch (OOW). The OOW relays the important information to the Captain.
This system of many team members – each working on equipment they have been very well-trained to operate and reporting through a command structure that filters all but the most important information to the captain – is highly effective in war when a warship is exchanging salvos of high speed torpedoes and missiles with numerous hostile targets (anyone doubting this should read Jeff Edward’s excellent book “Torpedo”). But this structure is ineffective when dealing with a single slow moving merchant ship.
An eye on the target and direct communication – Captain to Captain – is the most effective means of avoiding collision but this never happens on Navy ships. When a merchant ship attempts to call a U.S. Navy warship he first has to establish contact. Calling another merchant ship is relatively easy, you find the name of the ship on your AIS and hail it on the VHF. But the US Navy often turns off its AIS transmitter to prevent enemy’s from tracking warships via internet sites like MarineTraffic.com which pick up the AIS signal via commercial satellites and publish the positions online.
The alternative way to contact a Navy ship is by calling out its hull number (painted in huge white numbers on the bow) but, for various reasons, the Navy doesn’t always respond to this number.
Provided you do establish contact with the oncoming destroyer you run into another major obstacle. The person who responds to your call is not the Captain but a junior officer who relays the message to the Officer Of The Deck who relays it to the Captain. The Captain’s response then has to go back down the chain where time and information is lost, mistakes are made and the delays occur. Hard data is, more often than not, conveyed accurately, but more nuanced information – like the sound or anger, hesitation or exhaustion in the captain’s voice – is lost.
The communication problems don’t stop there. Navy ships require that information from complex systems move quickly between officers and they carry this out with a large vocabulary of acronyms, abbreviations and units of measurement that are highly effective for communication between American naval officers but are gibberish to foreign ship captains.
For example… a foreign ship captain will order his helmsman to turn port or starboard but an American captain orders left and right turns. Merchant Captains prefer true bearings based off the compass but Navy Captains prefer relative bearings based off the centerline of his own ship. And most frustrating of all, merchant mariners use Nautical Miles to denote distance but the Navy measures everything in yards.
Small differences? Maybe but a series of small discrepancies can lead to big problems.
Was VHF contact established between the two vessels before the collision? Why was the USS Fitzgerald Captain in his stateroom and not on the bridge looking out the window? Was he tuned into the VHF radio monitoring the conversation? Was the containership captain fluent in English and, if not, did the navy radioman listen with patience and speak with simple clarity? Did they communicate externally with international accepted standards or use U.S. Navy centric jargon?
This is important because basic communication problems have been found to be a primary cause in nearly every multi-vessel incident gCaptain has reported on in the last ten years.
作者: 约翰・康拉德船长（gCaptain）
每艘船舶，无论其国籍或目的，都需要携带一本简洁的书。这本书的标题是“国际避碰规则”，但是它的字母缩词“COLREG”更为人所知。这些章节很短，对於要求保持执照有效的COLREGs测试，船长需要90分才能过关。为了通过这个严格的要求，船员们开发了助记口诀，帮助他们记住内容。当船失去操舵控制时，COLREG要求船舶在垂直线上，显示两个红灯。这个规则的助记口诀是“红上加红，船长死了”。如果是帆船，需要显示红色和绿色的灯光，并且表示“绿上红，帆船”。还有更多这样的口诀，但是避免与海军军舰的碰撞，最重要一个口诀，却没有加上去，那就是：“如果它灰溜溜，闪远点”。1
虽然媒体只有一些很少的证据，去试图了解驱逐舰USS Fitzgerald碰撞的夜晚，集装箱船ACX水晶的不规则航路很可疑...专业水手确信，长时间的调查后，将发现美国海军船舶是有过失的。
这个结论是傲慢专业的结果吗？或者，也许是因为怨恨和嫉妒海军船长，长期被公众和媒体赞誉和妆点? 而商船船长，大多不被注意的事实。还是因为这个结论是正确的？
我作为多年来一直与美国海军在船上和岸上，共同工作的船长，这就是为什么，我相信这是正确的。美国海军船舶是有过失的。
通讯失败
尽管电子碰撞避免工具如自动识别系统（AIS）的最新进展，避免碰撞的三个最重要的工具是船长的眼睛，舌头和耳朵。
眼睛，由本船的窗户往外看，是重要的，因为船长可以比雷达和电子海图系统，更快与更准确地处理信息，例如不规律的路线变化，电子系统是需要时间来汇总数据。
舌头是因为最快捷最有效的方式，来预测在碰撞前的几分钟内，他船将如何操纵，就是在VHF甚高频无线电台上，呼叫另一艘船长来询问。
耳朵是重要的，因为语言障碍和文化差异，在海上是很严重的，如果你想有机会理解他船的意图，你必须专心听对方的答复。
在与ACX Crystal进行通信时，Fitzgerald的船长很可能，只使用了这些工具中的一个，也可能没有。
在导致碰撞的时刻，商船船长必须做所有事情，除了操舵以外。在一名船副的帮助下，他必须观看雷达和AIS，绘制附近船只的相对航向，与机舱通讯，与VHF甚高频无线上的其他船舶通话，并发出操船命令。但是在海军舰艇上，这些工作都是由一小队水手执行的，他们向当值船副OOW报告的任何变化，并遵守命令。 OOW当值船副，再将重要信息传递给船长。
这种有许多成员的团队系统 - 每个人都在，已经训练有素的设备上工作，他们通过指挥架构进行操作和报告，只将所有最重要的信息过滤给船长 - 在海战中，当战舰正在交互炮击，高速鱼雷和导弹，有许多敌对的标的。但是，在处理单一缓慢移动的商船时，这种指挥架构是无效的。
看著目标和直接沟通 - 船长对船长 - 是避免碰撞的最有效手段，但这绝对不可能在海军的船上发生。当商船试图打电话给美国海军军舰时，他首先必须建立联系。打电话给另一艘商船比较容易，您可以在AIS上找到船舶的名称，并在VHF上呼叫。但美国海军经常须关闭其AIS发射器，以防止敌人通过诸如MarineTraffic.com这样的网站跟踪军舰，MarineTraffic.com通过商用卫星接收AIS信号并在线上发布。
联系海军船只的另一种方法是，通过呼出船体号码（以船头上的巨大白色数字表示），但是由於各种原因，海军并不会，总是对这一组数字作出回应。
就算你与迎面而来的驱逐舰，建立了联系，你将遇到了另一个主要障碍。回应你的电话的人，不是船长，而是一名初级军官，他将信息转发给船上的长官，再将其转交给船长。船长的回应，然后必须回到原来的指挥链上，直到时间和信息都流失后，造成错误，或发生延误。生硬的资讯，往往总能准确传达，但更为细致的信息 - 如船长声音的声调或愤怒，犹豫或疲惫 - 都失去了。
沟通问题并不止於此。海军舰艇要求复杂系统的信息，在军官之间，可以迅速移动，并以大量词汇，缩写和测量单位。这对美国海军军官之间的沟通非常有效，但对外国船长来说，是无聊的。
例如...外国船长将命令他的舵手，转向turn port or starboard side，但美国船长命令左右转向是left and right turns。商船长更喜欢，基於罗盘上真方位，但是海军船长喜欢，相对於本船船艏向的方位。最令人沮丧的是，商船们使用“海里”表示距离，但海军则以码数衡量一切。
小差异？可能吧。 只是一系列小的差异，会导致大的问题。
在碰撞之前，两艘船之间是否有VHF联络？为什么USS Fitzgerald船长在他的住舱里，而不是在驾驶台上往窗外了望？他是否关切监控VHF对话？集装箱船长的英文是否流利，如果不是，海军无线电士是否用耐心听，并能简单的讲呢？他们是否以国际公认对外的标准用语，还是以美国海军为中心的行话通信呢？
这是很重要的，因为基础通信的问题，已经被发现是gCaptain在过去十年中，几乎每个多船事件报导的主要原因。
The Lack Of Specialists
In the not so distant past, merchant ship captains holding a “Master Unlimited” license, the highest license issued by the Coast Guard, were legally sanctioned to command any ship of any size upon oceans. The only limitation placed on that license was large sailing ships (Tall Ships). While that is still technically true today, a containership company would not hire a tanker captain and a cruise ship company would not give a large cruise ship to a containership captain. They want people having experience aboard similar types of ships.
It takes a bachelor’s degree from a Maritime Academy plus approximately 10 years and the completion of weeks worth of intense testing to earn a Master Unlimited license. There are ways around some of these requirements (like having a college degree) depending on the flag state, but all maritime nations have strict rules governing how many days of those 10 years were spent at sea. A civilian ship captain will spend at least a few hours on the bridge of the ship every day of work. That translates to a lot of experience avoiding collision.
The U.S. Navy also has specialized strict standards for enlisted sailors. If you want to operate a RADAR, for example, you must pass general examinations, be selected, attend the Navy’s challenging “A” school and commit to a five year service obligation. Then enlisted sailors have to prove their ability aboard ship under the watchful eye of non-commissioned officers.
Each individual piece of critical equipment aboard a navy ship has a highly trained and competent person(s) assigned to it. The total number of people working, on both the bridge and the Combat Information Center (CIC) to navigate the ship exceeds a dozen.
The merchant ship captain, who has to operate all equipment himself, often has to use his experience and expertise to fill in gaps of information. But the Naval officer has the opposite problem. He is often working with too much information as it comes in from all the enlisted people who work for him… and he has to use his knowledge and experience to filter out unnecessary data. The question is, how much experience does he have?
The captain of a merchant ship does not work in an office, he never gets sent to the engine room to stand a watch, and with just two dozen people aboard his ship at any one time he is free of most of the administrative and disciplinary duties that come with commanding a Navy destroyer with five times the number of sailors.
But unlike the merchant captain and the enlisted specialists working on navy ships, the U.S. Navy Captain and his bridge officer (OOD) are generalists. A large percentage of their careers are spent working shoreside jobs and their shipboard time was spent rotating through positions: the engine room, the combat information room, in administrative positions and elsewhere.
In short, the merchant ship captain and bridge officers have significantly higher number of hours spent on the bridge then their naval counterparts.
Why Was The Navy Captain In His Cabin
One myth that persists among the general public is that Captain Joseph Hazelwood, master of the Exxon Valdez, was drunk at the wheel of his ship when she grounded on Bligh Reef. The truth is far different.
Captain Hazelwood rightfully shouldered the blame for that incident because a Captain is responsible for the actions of his crew but his level of intoxication, if any (blood alcohol tests were inconclusive) was found not to be a primary cause of the incident. How could it be? He was not on the bridge of the ship when it grounded. He was in his cabin! The ship was grounded not by Hazelwood but by a junior officer he trusted to navigate the ship safely.
Ship Captains never take the wheel and drive the ship, helmsmen and autopilots do that job. Ship captains spend most of their time in the office doing paperwork or managing people all around the ship. The actual navigation of the vessel is done on the bridge by a junior officer called the Officer In Charge Of The Navigational Watch (OICNW). The US Navy operates the same way but that officer is the Officer Of The Deck (OOD).
It is this officer’s duty to navigate the ship safely according to the voyage plan laid out by the captain. This officer is in charge of communicating with and avoiding other ships. He is the one responsible for avoiding collisions and he holds this responsibility with important caveat; it is his duty to call the captain whenever there is possible risk of collision or danger of any kind.
And it is the Captain’s duty to go to the bridge whenever he is called for help.
缺乏专业
在不太遥远的过去，拥有“无限吨位”执照的商船船长，是海岸警卫队颁发的最高许可证，依法规管制，可以在海上任何船只工作。该许可证的唯一限制，是大型帆船（高船）。虽然今天仍然是真实的，但在技术上，集装箱公司不会雇用油轮船长，游轮公司也不会让集装箱船长做大型游轮。他们希望有经验的人，都是做相似类型船舶。
无限吨位商船船长，需要海事学院的学士学位，加上大约10年的海勤时间，并完成了数周的激烈测试，以获得无限制许可证。这些要求（如拥有大学学位），有一些取决於船旗国的规定，但所有海事国家都有严格的规则，管理这10年在海上的天数。一艘商船船长，每天至少要花上几个小时在船上工作。这意味著避免碰撞的经验很多。
美国海军，也对兵员有严格的标准。例如，如果你想操作雷达，你必须通过普通考试，被选中，参加海军挑战性的“A”学校，承诺提供五年的服务义务。然后登船的船员，必须在非委任的官员的监视下，证明其船上的工作能力。
海军船上的每一件关键装备，都有一名受过高度训练合格的人员在操作。在驾驶台和战情中心（CIC）上工作的人员，总数超过十几人。
自己操作所有设备的商船船长，常常要用自己的经验和专业，填补信息的空白。但海军军官，却有相反的问题。所有为他经常工作的人员，提供了太多的信息，他必须利用他的知识和经验，来过滤掉不必要的数据。问题是，他能有多少经验？
一艘商船的船长，不必在办公室工作，他从来没有被送到机房当过一班，在他的船上，只有二十几人要管理，他没有太多的行政和纪律责任。指挥一条海军驱逐舰，水兵人数是他的五倍。
但不像商船，和在军舰上工作的士官，[美国海军军官和他的驾驶台官员（OOD）都是通才。他们职业生涯的很大一部分，是在岸上工作，他们在船的时间，经常转移职位：机舱，战情中心，行政职位和其他地方。
简而言之，商船船长和船副，比起海军舰艇上的相同职务，当班花的时间，要多得多。
为什么海军船长在他的住舱
持续存在於公众中的一个神话是，埃克森堡瓦尔德兹轮Exxon Valdez的船长约瑟夫・赫泽尔伍德（Captain Joseph Hazelwood），在Bligh Reef搁浅时，在船的上驾驶台喝醉了。真相是截然不同的。
Hazelwood船长正确地承担了，这一事件的责任，是因为船长本就该负责船员的行为，但他的酒精度浓度（如果有的话，（血液酒精测试不确定））不是被认为事件的主因。怎么会这样？当船搁浅时，他不在驾驶台上。他在他的住舱里，该船不是由Hazelwood去搁浅的，而是由一名资浅船副，他信任能安全航行的船副。
船长从来没有拿过舵轮，操纵船只，舵手和自动舵机，在做这项工作。船长花费大部分时间，在办公室做文书工作，或管理船上的人员。该船的实际导航是由一名名为“航行班负责船副”（OICNW）的初级船副在驾驶台上完成的。美国海军的运作方式相同，但该军官叫是”甲板官员”（OOD）。
根据船长制定的航程计划，该员有义务安全驾驶船舶。该员负责与其他船舶进行沟通和避碰。他是负责避免碰撞的人，他承担了重要的责任;每当有可能发生碰撞，或任何危险时，他有责任打电话给船长。
当被要求帮助时，船长有义务去驾驶台。
But the captain of the USS Fitzgerald, like Captain Hazelwood, was not on the bridge. He remained in his cabin where he was injured during the collision. Did the OOD fail to call him up to the bridge for help managing the situation? Did he ignore the OOD’s call for help? Or, like the Exxon Valdez, did the bridge team not realize they were in trouble until it was too late?
Either way, a major error was made by someone aboard the USS Fitzgerald.
Available Resources
USS Fitzgerald
Let’s take a quick look at just some of the resources the USS Fitzgerald’s captain had at his disposal prior to the collision.
The USS Fitzgerald is an Arleigh Burke class destroyer with a top speed well in excess of 30 knots. Speed is helpful in preventing collision because it allows you to put more distance between you and a dangerous ship in the same amount of time. (Yes, speed can also be dangerous.)
She is powered by four gas turbine engines with over 100,000 horsepower available to turn her propellers. Gas turbines are expensive and burn lots of fuel but the Navy uses them because they can provide an immense amount of torque in a very short period of time. Torque translates to acceleration and acceleration is important if you need to get out of the way of something fast.
The Arleigh Burke class destroyer has highly advanced AN/SPY-1 three dimensional RADAR, variable pulse width surface RADAR, AIS transceivers and a hull mounted sonar array tied into an Electronic Warfare Suite capable of tracking objects of small size moving at a high speed in real time.
The USS Fitzgerald is highly maneuverable with a very tight turning radius. While the exact figures are not public information this video of an Arleigh Burke Destroyer turning 180 degrees is very impressive.
Containership ACX Crystal
The Containership ACX Crystal however… has a theoretical top speed of 25 knots but is rarely pushed that fast.
She has a single 8-cylinder diesel engine capable of pushing one propeller with 29,200 horses for 3/10ths the amount of power of the destroyer. The acceleration of a ship like this is measured in miles, not minutes like the destroyer. Diesel engines like hers are the size of a modest house and are locked into a certain speed at night. The bridge officer can cut speed immediately but at the risk of damaging equipment. Changing speed safely requires that the engineers wake up, change into work clothes and walk down to the engine room to check the equipment before moving the throttle.
She has two RADAR sets of modern design that is likely able to overlay digital charts. Said RADAR system requires a minimum of 3 minutes of pinging to properly calculate another ship’s change in course and/or speed.
She also has an AIS receiver that plots the position, course, speed, rate of turn and other useful information on the RADAR display in (close to) real time. In turn, her AIS system transmits her information to other ships including warships. She must, by law, transmit this information at all times. Her AIS unit does not, however, receive any data from Navy ships who cloak their positions.
She weighs four times as much as the destroyer. She can also stop and turn on a dime… but only if that dime is owned by giants and has a diameter measured in nautical miles.
She has 8 officers, a captain and around a dozen unlicensed sailors… versus the destroyer’s 33 officers, 38 chief petty officers and 210 enlisted sailors.
But I thought the Containership Was At Fault?
The media has been publishing reports on “crazy ivan turns” and erratic behavior all based on incomplete and one sided AIS data which can not yet be correlated with the exact time of collision. It is too early, and information too scant, to publish a list of her faults.
That said, she is at fault! Remember the COLREGS? What I failed to mention in the beginning of this article is that, while terse, the book is littered with terms like “safe speed”, “due diligence” and “lookout by all available means”. These words are nebulous and have remained so for centuries for a reason… so that no captain can ever shirk his responsibility for avoiding a collision. The COLREGS are terse, specific and targeted when it comes to assigning blame but soft and imprecise when it comes to removing responsibility and blame. Thus, every modern admiralty court trial of ships colliding has found fault with both ships, even if one is securely anchored!
Under COLREGS, whenever two ships touch each other, both Captains are to blame.
For this reason I am 99.9% confident that the Captain of the USS Fitzgerald will be found at fault… and so will the Captain of the ACX Crystal.
但是，菲茨杰拉德（USS Fitzgerald）的船长，就像哈泽尔伍德船长，不在驾驶台上。他留在他的住舱内，在碰撞时受伤。 OOD没有把他叫到桥上，帮助管理这个情况？他是否忽视了OOD的呼叫？或者像埃克森・巴尔德斯一样，驾驶台团队并没有意识到，他们遇到麻烦，直到太晚了？
无论哪种方式，USS Fitzgerald上，都有人犯了重大错误。
可用资源
USS Fitzgerald
我们来看看美国的菲茨杰拉德船长在碰撞之前，所掌握的一些资源。
USS Fitzgerald是一个Arleigh Burke级驱逐舰，最高速度超过30海里。速度有助於防止碰撞，因为它允许您在相同的时间内，在您和危险的船舶之间，留下更多的距离。 （是的，速度也能是危险的。）
她由四台燃气涡轮发动机提供动力，超过十万马力，可用於转动螺旋桨。燃气轮机价格昂贵，燃烧大量燃料，但海军使用它们，因为它们可以在很短的时间内，提供巨大的转矩。转矩可以转换为加速度，加速度是重要的，如果你需要快速摆脱的方法。
Arleigh Burke级驱逐舰具有高度先进的AN / SPY-1三维雷达，可变脉宽地表雷达，AIS收发器，和在电子战套件中的，船体固定声纳阵列，能够即时跟踪，高速移动的小尺寸物体。
USS Fitzgerald具有很高的机动性，回转半径很窄。虽然确切的数字，是不公开信息，但是Arleigh Burke Destroyer的视频显示 video of an Arleigh Burke Destroyer turning 180 degrees ， 180度回转是令人印象非常深刻。
集装箱船ACX水晶号
然而，集装箱ACX水晶号最高速度，理论上为25节，但很少全速前进。
她拥有一台8缸柴油发动机，能够用单一推进器产生29200匹马力，是驱逐舰马力的3/10。像这样的船，加车是以海里计，而不是像驱逐舰，是以几分钟计算。像她这样船的柴油发动机，是一个普通房子的大小，在晚上，被锁到一定的速度。驾驶台官员可以立即减速，但有设备损坏的风险。安全地改变速度，需要工程师在油门做动之前醒来，换成工作服，然后走到机舱去检查设备。
她有两套现代化设计雷达RADAR，可以重叠显示在电子海图上。这种雷达RADAR系统需，至少3分钟的测绘，才能正确计算另一艘船的航线和/或速度变化。
她还有一个AIS接收器，可以在RADAR显示器上，即时显示位置，航向，速度，转速等有用信息。反过来，她的AIS系统，将她的信息传送到其他船只，包括军舰。依法她必须发送这一信息。然而，她的AIS系统，并没有收到海军船只，传送其职务上的任何资料。
她的重量是驱逐舰的四倍。她也可以停车，开始一分钱式的回转，但这一分钱只有巨人能用，直径是以海里为单位。
她有8名船副管轮，一名船长和十几名无执照的水手，而驱逐舰有33名军官，38士官长和210名专业海员。
但我认为集装箱是否有故障？
媒体一直在发布关於“疯狂的伊凡翻弯”和不稳定行为的报告，这些行为都是基於不完整和单面的AIS数据，这些数据与确切的碰撞时间无关。现在还为时过早，而且信息太少，不得不公布她的错误清单。
那说，她是错的！记得COLREGS吗？在这篇文章的开头我没有提到的是，尽管这本书充斥著“安全的速度”，“尽职调查”和“以一切可用的手段”的术语。这些话是模糊的，因为一个原因已经存在了几个世纪，所以没有一个队长可以推卸责任，避免碰撞。当涉及到消除责任和责备时，COLREGS是简洁明了的，具体的和针对性的，当涉及到分配责任，但软和不精确。因此，每次现代海军法庭审判的船舶碰撞都发现了两艘舰船的故障，即使是安全锚定！
在COLREGS下，每当两艘船互相碰撞时，两名船长都要责怪。
因此，我有99.9％的信心，美国海军Fitzgerald的船长将被发现是错误的，ACX水晶船长也是如此。
About John Konrad
Captain John Konrad is the founder and CEO of gCaptain and author of the book Fire On The Horizon. John is a USCG licensed Master of Unlimited Tonnage, has sailed a variety of ships from ports around the world and is a distinguished alumni of SUNY Maritime College.
船长约翰・康拉德是gCaptain的创始人兼首席执行官，并且是“火之地平线”一书的作者。 约翰是USCG授权的无限吨位硕士，已经从世界各地的港口出发了各种船舶，并且是SUNY海事学院杰出的校友。